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INCREASING FIRST AMENDMENT
SCRUTINY OF TRADEMARK LAW
Lisa P. Ramsey*
ABSTRACT
Trademarks consist of language. Trademark law regulates certain uses
of trademarked language to communicate information or ideas, yet few
courts subject trademark law to First Amendment scrutiny. This Article
argues that more courts should. Not every infringing use of a trademark is
misleading commercial speech. The Supreme Court has struck down other
nonmisleading commercial speech regulations using intermediate constitu-
tional scrutiny. Moreover, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence dic-
tates that content-based trademark laws regulating noncommercial speech
should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis. This Article provides a de-
tailed framework for understanding how trademark law can raise serious
First Amendment concerns and sets forth the options for courts who ac-
knowledge this conflict. Most courts protect speech by narrowly construing
trademark claims and broadly interpreting defenses. This doctrinal ap-
proach protects expression in individual cases, but protected speech is still
harmed by trademark law in the real world. It is often difficult to predict
the outcome of trademark law's multi-factor balancing tests. Those who
cannot afford to litigate will self-censor rather than fight for their right of
free expression. Trademark law will better serve First Amendment interests
if it contains more speech-protective trademark rules or categorical safe
harbors for certain uses of trademarks. Among other benefits, categorical
rules create more predictability and make it easier for courts to dispose of
frivolous trademark disputes early. Finally, when trademark laws suppress
or chill protected expression, courts should not hesitate to apply First
Amendment scrutiny and find that law unconstitutional.
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IRMS use language to sell goods and services. If the words used
are claimed as trademarks by others, use of that language may re-
sult in trademark litigation. Firms have sued competitors based on
their use of the phrase "We'll Pick You Up" as a slogan for car rental
services, "Travel Planner" for travel guides, and "Bottled at Source" used
in packaging and advertising for bottled water. American Airlines sued
the Internet search engine firm Google for using its trademarks to trigger
sponsored advertising links displayed near organic search results. Louis
Vuitton Malletier S.A. sued Haute Diggity Dog claiming its "Chewy
Vuiton" line of dog toys infringed and diluted the "Louis Vuitton" mark.
A firm claiming rights in the registered trademark "Life is Good" has
accused others of trademark violations for using similar words in adver-
tising for electronics ("Life's Good") and on the front of T-shirts ("Life is
Gay" and "Life Sucks"). The owner of a trademark registration for the
term "Change Rocks" for jewelry claims Barack Obama's political cam-
paign must get permission before it can sell T-shirts or other campaign
memorabilia that displays the term "Change Rocks." These trademark
disputes raise an important question: Is there a First Amendment right to
use words to advertise or sell goods and services, or display words on T-
shirts and other merchandise, when those words are claimed as trade-
marks by others?1
Early trademark law focused on protecting firms from illegitimate di-
versions of their trade by competitors. 2 The government banned the de-
ceptive and misleading use of distinctive trademarks that caused a
likelihood of confusion regarding the source of commercial goods or ser-
vices. For example, a competitor of Coca-Cola Company could not use
the "Coca-Cola" mark or a similar term as a brand name for its own
drink product.3 Such restrictions on use of a trademark did not raise First
Amendment concerns. Commercial advertising was not deemed to be
worthy of protection by the First Amendment until the 1970s.4 Moreo-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. For information about the trademark disputes mentioned
in this paragraph see Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378
(5th Cir. 2001); Official Airline Guides v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993): CG Roxanne
LLC v. Fiji Water Co., No. C-07-02258, 2008 WL 2782745 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2008); Com-
plaint, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-00487 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2007);
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007);
Complaint, Life is Good, Inc. v. KGR Kids, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-11789-NG (D. Mass. Oct. 3,
2006); Steve Bailey, What Would Jake Say?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.
boston.com/business/articles/2007/09/05/whatwould-jake say?mode=pf; Alex Beam,
Whose 'Good Life' is it Anyway, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9. 2006, http://www.boston.com/ae/
media/articles/2006/10/09/whose-good-life is-it-anyway/; Julie Moran Alterio, Scarsdale
Teen Jilted by Obama's Slogan, JOURNAL NEWS, Jan. 10, 2008, at 1A.
2. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (4th ed. 2008).
3. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Cahill, 480 F.2d 153, 153-54 (10th Cir. 1973).




ver, courts and commentators noted that restrictions on misleading com-
mercial uses of trademarks are constitutional because misleading
commercial speech is categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. 5
Today, there are reasons to doubt the constitutionality of some trade-
mark laws. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently increased constitutional
scrutiny of commercial speech regulations and found some laws unconsti-
tutional under Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny test.6 At the same
time, the legislature has extended trademark protection to descriptive
terms that have acquired distinctiveness 7 and allowed famous trademark
holders to prevent diluting uses of their marks in nonmisleading commer-
cial speech. 8 Courts have interpreted trademark law's likelihood of con-
fusion requirement to cover new types of confusion, such as initial
interest confusion.9 Furthermore, trademark law is now applied to the
use of marks in commentary, parody, and satire-including domain
names, books, magazines, T-shirts, and films-because confusion regard-
ing the markholder's sponsorship or approval of the expression is now
actionable.10 Protected expression is frequently suppressed or chilled by
5. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021-22(9th Cir. 1985) ("Commercial speech may be regulated when its content is otherwise false
or misleading.") (citing Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-73); Robert C. Denicola, Trade-
marks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection
of the Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 165-66; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 221(1998); see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 &
n.12 (1987) ("The Government constitutionally may regulate 'deceptive and misleading'
commercial speech.") (citing Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1979)).
6. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980);
see also infra Part I.A. Moreover, some Supreme Court Justices have said they want to
abandon this test and hold that truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech is fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment, just like noncommercial speech. See infra Part I.A. As
noted by Professor McKenna, a higher level of review of commercial speech regulations
will have "significant consequences for trademark protection." Mark P. McKenna, The
Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual
Property, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 26-28 (2006).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), (f) (2000); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 171 (1995); see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1113-18 (2004) (discussing the evolution of trademark protection for
descriptive terms).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (covering use of a famous trademark in a manner
"that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark,
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of
actual economic injury").
9. E.g., Brookfield Commcn's, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-65(9th Cir. 1999); see Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Cross-
roads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 106-10 (2005).
10. E.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362(4th Cir. 2001); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguins Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396(9th Cir. 1997); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1994);
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1979); Am. DairyQueen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D. Minn. 1998). In this
Article, the term "commentary" is meant to encompass both positive and negative com-
mentary, including criticism, that incorporates another's mark. A "parody" means use of a
mark to poke fun at the markholder or its mark, products, services, or activities. "Satire"
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trademark law because the law's current built-in First Amendment safe-
guards, such as the descriptive fair use doctrine, are limited and involve
fact-specific determinations that often can only be resolved after discov-
ery at summary judgment or trial-a cost many defendants cannot
afford.11
Although many current trademark doctrines raise First Amendment
concerns, defendants often do not plead a First Amendment defense,
12
and courts do not generally apply constitutional analysis to trademark
laws or injunctions. Some courts incorrectly conclude the constitutional
requirement of state action is not satisfied in private civil trademark liti-
gation. 13 Others mistakenly hold certain actionable uses of a mark are
not "speech" that implicates the First Amendment, 14 characterize non-
commercial speech as commercial,' 5 assume infringing commercial use of
a mark is misleading commercial speech, 16 or erroneously treat trade-
mark laws like content-neutral speech regulations. 17 Some courts do rec-
ognize that First Amendment values are relevant in trademark disputes. 18
uses a mark to ridicule someone or something unrelated to the markholder, such as society.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 & n.15 (1994); Harley Davidson,
Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the "Supreme Court's
parody explication as to copyrights... is relevant to trademarks").
11. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, First Amendment Limitations on Trademark Rights,
in 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 147, 159 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); William McGeveran, Rethinking
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1160656; Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1167-69.
12. E.g., Answer at 18-19, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-00487 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 7, 2007).
13. E.g., Empire Home Servs., L.L.C. v. Empire Iron Works, Inc., No. 05-CV-72584,
2007 WL 1218717, at *8 (E.D. Mich. April 23, 2007) (finding defendant's constitutional
argument unpersuasive because "government restraints on commercial speech" are "sim-
ply not present in an intellectual property dispute between two private parties"); Reddy
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633-34 (D.D.C. 1977);
Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (M.D.N.C. 1977); see also infra
Part II.A.
14. E.g., SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); see also infra Part II.B.
15. E.g., World Wrestling Fed'n v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919 (E.D.
Va. 2000), affd on other grounds, 263 F. 3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v.
New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (D. Minn. 1998).
16. E.g., Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR, 2008 WL 755069, at *31 (D. Kan.
Mar. 19, 2008); Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal.
1992).
17. E.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979); Univ. of Kan., 2008 WL 755069, at *31 (citing Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.3d
at 206).
18. E.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2005); Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-02, 906-07 (9th Cir. 2002); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Ban-
tam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493-97 (2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29-34 (1st Cir. 1987); Burnett v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972-74 (C.D. Cal. 2007); E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc.
v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1037-48 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Charles Atlas,
Ltd. v. D.C. Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
2008]
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But usually these courts use trademark doctrine rather than constitu-
tional analysis to rule for the defendant, 19 or ignore the Supreme Court's
First Amendment doctrine-such as strict scrutiny analysis for content-
based regulations of noncommercial speech-and create and apply their
own speech-protective common law trademark doctrines, such as the
Rogers balancing test.20 Trademark doctrine and this balancing test can
protect expression when the court rules for the defendant. Yet some-
times plaintiffs prevail, and they do so without proving this application of
trademark law satisfies true constitutional analysis.2 '
Scholars have noted the recent expansion of trademark rights may
harm expression.2 2 Some argue specific trademark doctrines are uncon-
stitutional, such as trademark protection for descriptive terms2 3 or the
current trademark dilution laws.2 4 Yet judges and commentators gener-
ally believe courts should protect First Amendment interests in trade-
mark disputes by applying speech-protective interpretations of trademark
statutes rather than constitutional adjudication. 25 As a result of strict ap-
19. E.g., Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314 (finding there is no likelihood of confusion).
20. E.g., Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901-02 (applying balancing test from Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)).
21. See e.g., supra notes 10, 13-17.
22. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive
Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 261-67 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks,
and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973,
975-77 (2007); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 796-816
(2004); Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment Limita-
tions on the Trademark Estate, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 48, 55-76 (1997); Denicola, supra note
5, at 158; Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark and
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 939-52 (1986); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399-412 (1990); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Bor-
der Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Ex-
pressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 890-906 (2005); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks
Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-78 (1993); Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks
and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody
Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1, 60-102 (1991); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and
the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697-1713 (1999); Jacqueline Lipton,
Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, and the First Amendment in Cyber-
space, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 1327, 1331-32 (2006); Mimi Rajapakse, Domain Names as Pro-
tected Speech: A Reexamination of the Fourth Circuit's Decision in People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 356-72 (2003); Hannibal Travis,
The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Cor-
porate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 8-31 (2005); Robert J.
Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1079, 1082-99, 1107-16 (1986).
23. Ramsey, supra note at 7, at 1146-74.
24. See infra Part II.D.1 (citing scholarship evaluating the constitutionality of trade-
mark dilution laws).
25. E.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1987)
(Campbell, C.J., dissenting); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 188-89, 209 (2004); William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals
for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1211-14 (2008);
see also Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 906 n.16 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to
rule on the First Amendment challenge after finding for defendant on other grounds);
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plication of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, most courts protect
free speech interests in trademark disputes by construing trademark
claims narrowly and defenses broadly. 26 This approach can protect ex-
pression in individual cases, but certain statutory provisions may not per-
mit a speech-protective interpretation or may suppress or chill protected
expression more than necessary. Courts and legislatures may decide that
they need to evaluate the constitutionality of a particular trademark law.
Unfortunately, there is currently no detailed and systematic framework in
the scholarship or case law for generally evaluating First Amendment
challenges to trademark laws using the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence.
This Article provides such a First Amendment framework for trade-
mark law.27 Before I set forth this framework, Part I first explains why
the Supreme Court's evolving commercial speech doctrine is extremely
relevant to the constitutionality of trademark law. The Court no longer
automatically defers to the legislature when it regulates nonmisleading
commercial speech. Part II provides a comprehensive roadmap for evalu-
ating the constitutionality of trademark law. It applies the Court's First
Amendment doctrine to current trademark law and uncovers some inter-
esting and unanticipated results.
Contrary to suggestions by some courts that there is no "state action"
or First Amendment "speech" in trademark disputes, trademarks easily
and clearly satisfy the threshold for First Amendment coverage. 28 Judi-
cial enforcement of trademark law is state action. Moreover, I argue that
the government regulates First Amendment "speech" in trademark cases
when courts enjoin or punish any use of another's mark due to the harm
caused by the content of the defendant's communication. Courts should
find that First Amendment "speech" is implicated when the defendant is
accused of conveying an allegedly infringing or diluting message by using
another's distinctive trademark. If it is actionable, use of a mark is
"speech" covered by the First Amendment. This includes use of a trade-
marked word or logo to identify a product source, as well as use of trade-
marked terms to trigger keyword advertising on the Internet and the use
of another's protected trade dress, such as distinctive product designs or
colors. Laws regulating such speech may be constitutional, but their con-
stitutionality must at least be considered.
Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (same). But see L.L. Bean, Inc.
v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding a trademark injunction issued
pursuant to the Maine anti-dilution statute violated the First Amendment).
26. See infra Part III.A.; see also Ramsey, supra note 11, at 154-63 (discussing cases).
27. This Article focuses on the constitutionality of trademark laws that regulate the
use of language claimed as a trademark, with a primary focus on federal trademark law. It
does not address the constitutionality of federal statutes allowing the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office to refuse to register certain trademarks, nor does it address whether
false advertising laws or specific state trademark laws are constitutional. These important
topics are beyond the scope of this Article.
28. See infra Part II.A.&B.
20081
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In the second half of Part II, I argue that courts should not dispose of
First Amendment challenges to trademark laws and injunctions by sum-
marily concluding that infringing use of a trademark is misleading com-
mercial speech categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.
Contrary to the assumption of most courts and scholars, I contend not
every commercial use of a mark that is likely to cause confusion rises to
the level of "misleading" speech.29 As I have argued elsewhere, 30 the
misleading commercial speech categorical exception should not apply to
use of another's trademarked term to accurately describe the attributes of
the defendant's product, even if the descriptive term is used in a brand
name, slogan, domain name, or otherwise "as a mark." The misleading
commercial speech exception should also not be used to ignore First
Amendment concerns in trademark cases involving keyword advertising
and commentary, parody, or satire where the mark is used to express
commercial information or ideas unrelated to identification of the source
of the defendant's products or services. Even if some consumers are
likely to be confused, these commercial uses of a mark have some expres-
sive constitutional value for other consumers, and thus do not satisfy the
high First Amendment threshold of "misleading" speech. Like trade-
mark dilution laws, the constitutionality of these speech restrictions
should be evaluated under the last three factors of the Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech regulations. 31 Once
these laws are subject to real First Amendment scrutiny, their constitu-
tionality becomes seriously suspect.32
At the end of Part II, I explain how courts try to minimize the impact
of trademark law on the free flow of expression by incorrectly character-
izing trademark laws as content-neutral speech regulations. 33 Professors
Volokh and Lemley correctly argue that trademark laws are content-
based speech regulations, even though they are generally viewpoint-neu-
tral.34 I supplement their excellent scholarship on this topic by providing
a more detailed application of the Court's content-based/content-neutral
jurisprudence to trademark law and set forth additional arguments dem-
onstrating why trademark laws are content-based speech regulations. I
argue the government is engaging in "word choice discrimination"-not
just subject matter discrimination-when it bans the unauthorized use of
trademarked words and symbols in certain types of speech. Content-
based restrictions of noncommercial speech are usually subject to strict
scrutiny analysis, which is almost always fatal. If the Court's current First
Amendment jurisprudence is faithfully applied, this raises serious ques-
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1148-52.
31. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980);
see infra Part I.A., II.D.1.
32. See infra Part II.D.1.
33. See infra Part II.D.2.
34. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts Af-
ter Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REv. 697, 703, 707-13 (2003); Lem-
ley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 218-20.
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tions regarding the constitutionality of trademark laws and injunctions
regulating noncommercial speech, including most noncommercial com-
mentary, parody, and satire. Yet legislatures and courts will likely (and
should) decide the First Amendment allows the government to prohibit
some misleading uses of trademarks "as marks" in noncommercial
speech, such as unauthorized use of the distinctive marks of political or
religious organizations to falsely identify the defendant's organization. 3
5
Courts may conclude that some trademark laws satisfy strict scrutiny or
decide that trademark laws should be subject to less stringent constitu-
tional scrutiny. Such a result would not be surprising since the goals of
trademark law are less insidious compared to other content-based speech
regulations. 36 The Supreme Court may adopt some version of the Rogers
balancing test for trademark disputes or create a new First Amendment
balancing test for trademark laws. Alternatively, the Court may instead
decide that certain types of trademark laws-such as core trademark in-
fringement laws-are categorically constitutional, like the Supreme Court
did in Eldred for "the traditional contours of copyright protection.
37
Any of these approaches to resolving the conflict between trademark and
free speech rights is preferable to courts ignoring free speech concerns in
trademark cases.
In Part III, I evaluate the various options for courts considering a First
Amendment challenge to a trademark law. Courts may use contextual
speech-protective interpretations of trademark law, constitutional analy-
sis, or categorical trademark rules to protect expression in individual
trademark disputes. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages.
The best way to protect free speech in trademark law generally is for
federal and state legislatures to enact more trademark rules or categorical
safe harbors similar to the exemption for noncommercial use of a mark in
federal dilution law.38 If legislatures do not enact more speech-protective
rules in the trademark statutes, courts should create them in the common
law unless such a construction of the statute is plainly contrary to its
terms or the intent of the legislature. When the statute does not permit
an interpretation that would make it constitutional, courts should not
hesitate to apply constitutional analysis and find that trademark law vio-
lates the First Amendment.
The First Amendment's free expression clause is relevant in trademark
disputes and may be a useful (although imperfect) tool for limiting the
expansion of trademark law. First Amendment doctrine is complex, in-
consistent, and problematic in a number of ways, but this is not sufficient
reason to exclude trademarks from First Amendment protection or avoid
constitutional analysis of unconstitutional trademark laws. The First
Amendment is not an absolute defense to application of trademark law,
35. See infra Part II.D.2.d.
36. Id.
37. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006).
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but it does require legislatures and courts to explicitly consider and pro-
tect free speech values when they regulate trademarks.
I. INCREASING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Trademark laws, such as the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (more
commonly known as the Lanham Act), regulate the use of words, names,
symbols, or devices as trademarks to communicate with the public. 39
They primarily regulate commercial speech. Commercial speech is within
the scope of the First Amendment's free expression clause, but it is not
fully protected today. This Part first provides background information
regarding the Supreme Court's evolving commercial speech doctrine, and
then explains how the Court's current definition of commercial speech
applies to different uses of a trademark that may be actionable today
under trademark law.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has become in-
creasingly protective of commercial speech. Back in 1942, in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, the Court held that "the Constitution imposes no restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising. ' 40 For over
thirty years, the Court's view after Valentine was "that commercial adver-
tising was unprotected by the First Amendment."'41 The only issue during
this period was "whether something was properly characterized as com-
mercial speech. '42
A major shift in the Court's commercial speech doctrine occurred in
1976 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 43 This case involved a First Amendment challenge of a state
statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs. 44 For the first time, the Court explicitly held that the First Amend-
ment protects commercial speech. 45 It defined commercial speech as
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction. ' 46
39. See Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 ("Lanham Act"); 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining the term "trademark").
40. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
41. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
42. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech 2 (Univ. of Pa.
Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-
42, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019264. This article will be published in
French in Libertd d'expression en Europe et aux Etats-Unis (Dalloz, 2008). See http://
lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/182/.
43. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). According to Professor Barendt, "[t]he Supreme Court
has considered the case for commercial speech coverage in many subsequent cases, but has
not significantly added to the arguments deployed in Virginia Pharmacy." ERIC BARENDT,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 401 (2d ed. 2005).
44. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50.
45. Id. at 762-65, 770.
46. Id. at 762 (internal quotations omitted).
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In its reasoning, the Court adopted a marketplace of ideas theory of
the First Amendment and emphasized the informative value of commer-
cial speech to its audience. 47 For example, it noted "a particular con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent politi-
cal debate. ' 48 Further, it noted that "society also may have a strong in-
terest in the free flow of commercial information" because it is
"indispensable" to "intelligent and well informed" private economic deci-
sions and "to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. '49 The Court was also concerned that
truthful commercial speech would be prohibited due to government pa-
ternalism; in this case, the government thought price advertising would
cause consumers to focus on price rather than quality.50 The government
should "assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them. '51
After Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech was within the scope of
the First Amendment. Yet the Court said some regulations of commer-
cial speech were still constitutionally allowed, including bans on false or
misleading commercial speech, restrictions on advertising for illegal prod-
ucts, and regulations related to the time, place, or manner of commercial
speech. 52 Today, the First Amendment protects commercial speech to a
lesser degree than political speech and other constitutionally guaranteed
expression, such as scientific and academic speech, news, editorial com-
mentary, literature, art, entertainment, and other public discourse. 53
Courts evaluate the constitutionality of nonmisleading commercial
speech regulations under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test.54
Compared to strict scrutiny analysis, this test is relatively lenient.55 Both
tests are discussed in Part II.D.
According to the Court, there is a "commonsense distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of
speech."'56 Yet when developing its commercial speech doctrine, the
47. Baker, supra note 42, at 2-3 (citing Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 429, 431-33 (1971)).
48. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
49. Id. at 764-65.
50. Id. at 769-70.
51. Id. at 770.
52. Id. at 771-72.
53. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (defining com-
mercial speech and explaining how it differs from other forms of expression entitled to
greater First Amendment protection).
54. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (applying Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
55. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 794.
56. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (internal quotations omitted).
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Court has struggled to provide a workable definition of this type of
speech entitled to lesser constitutional protection. Immediately after Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, it continued to define commercial speech as speech that
"does no more than propose a commercial transaction. '57 In Central
Hudson, the Court expanded the definition for commercial speech to "ex-
pression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."'58 Yet in later cases, it declined to apply this broad definition.
In Bolger, the Court noted the "core notion of commercial speech" is
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction. ' 59
In that case, however, the Court held the combination of several charac-
teristics provided strong support for the conclusion that informational
pamphlets about contraceptives were properly characterized as commer-
cial speech even though they "cannot be characterized merely as propos-
als to engage in commercial transactions": (1) the speech was an
advertisement; (2) the ad referenced a specific commercial product; and
(3) the defendant had an economic motivation for the speech.60 In 1989,
the Court reaffirmed in Fox that "the test for identifying commercial
speech" is not whether speech is sold for a profit, but whether it "pro-
poses a commercial transaction."'61 As of this writing, the Court contin-
ues to define commercial speech using the Virginia Pharmacy
definition.62
According to the Court, the determination of whether speech is "com-
mercial" turns on "a matter of degree."' 63 Commercial speech clearly in-
cludes advertising that provides information about products to induce a
commercial transaction, such as commercial price and product advertis-
ing.64 Yet it does not include all advertising. Some paid advertising, such
as political advertising, is fully protected political speech.65 In addition,
speech other than advertising, such as personal direct solicitation of po-
tential customers, is classified as commercial speech.66 Commentators
debate whether corporate speech about political or social issues, state-
ments in a company prospectus or annual report, lifestyle or image adver-
tisements, viral marketing, product placement, and political or social
57. E.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979); Linkmark Assocs., Inc. v. Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977).
58. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
59. Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 & n.13 (1983) (holding
that informational pamphlets on topics such as "Condoms and Human Sexuality" were
commercial speech, but noting that defendants conceded the pamphlets were product
advertisements).
60. Id. at 66-67.
61. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74, 482 (1989)
(holding that the "Tupperware parties" held in campus dormitory rooms were commercial
speech because they "propose a commercial transaction").
62. E.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
63. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993).
64. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505-07 (1981); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).
65. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
66. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) (accountants); Bd. of Trs. of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-75 (1989) (Tupperware salespersons).
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commentary on blogs for business development purposes should be clas-
sified as commercial speech. 67
The Court acknowledged the inconsistency and indeterminacy of its
commercial speech doctrine in City of Cincinnati.68 Moreover, it empha-
sized that courts must be careful not to "place too much importance on
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. ' 69 Jus-
tice Stevens has noted the "artificiality of a rigid commercial/non-com-
mercial distinction."'70 Justice Thomas doubts "whether it is even possible
to draw a coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech." 71 Similar concerns are raised by scholars.72 The failure of the
Court to provide an effective definition for commercial speech has led
some critics to argue that the Court should completely eliminate the First
Amendment distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.73 The Court has not adopted this proposal, but it has increased
First Amendment scrutiny of regulations of nonmisleading commercial
speech. Recently, the Court applied the Central Hudson test to strike
down several commercial speech regulations as unconstitutional. 74
Moreover, some Justices have argued that the Court should use
stronger First Amendment scrutiny when evaluating the constitutionality
of government restrictions of truthful and nonmisleading commercial
speech. In Central Hudson, three members of the Court-Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun, and Stevens-stated that they would have held that any
ban on truthful and nonmisleading commercial advertisements should be
struck down regardless of whether it satisfied the Central Hudson test.75
In the Rubin case in 1995, Justice Stevens argued in a concurring opinion
that "the formulaic approach" of Central Hudson was "unsuited" for a
speech regulation that "neither prevents misleading speech nor protects
67. E.g., BARENDT, supra note 43, at 395-99; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1088-89 (3d ed. 2006); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine
Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? This Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1143, 1143-45 (2004); Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial
Speech: A New Analytical Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 127 (2007).
68. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422-23 (1993).
69. Id. at 424.
70. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (1990) (arguing "the commercial/noncommercial distinction
makes no sense"); Post, supra note 53, at 5 (noting that the "boundaries" of commercial
speech are "quite blurred").
73. E.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 72, at 650-53. Other scholars disagree. See,
e.g., BARENDT, supra note 43, at 398; Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 67, at 1156-60.
74. E.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-77 (2002) (plurality opin-
ion); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-56, 561-66 (plurality opinion); Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183-96 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504-08 (1996) (plurality opinion); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 482-91 (1995).
75. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 572 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 579,
583 (Stevens, J., with Brennan, J., concurring).
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consumers from the dangers of incomplete information. '76 One year
later in 44 Liquormart, Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the
Court, said when the government "entirely prohibits the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart
from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally de-
mands."'77 In concurring opinions in 44 Liquormart and Lorillard, respec-
tively, Justices Scalia and Kennedy also expressed concern that the
Central Hudson test does not sufficiently protect truthful and nonmis-
leading commercial speech.78 In 2002, a plurality of Justices in Thompson
said the government is prohibited from suppressing commercial speech
"in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions
with the information. " 79
Justice Thomas is currently the Court's most vocal critic of Central
Hudson. In several concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his
disapproval of the Central Hudson test when applied to government bans
on truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech. Where "the govern-
ment's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service igno-
rant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace," Justice
Thomas concluded in 44 Liquormart that, "such an 'interest' is per se ille-
gitimate and can no more justify regulation of 'commercial' speech than it
can justify regulation of 'noncommercial' speech.80 He did "not believe
that [the Central Hudson] test should be applied to a restriction of 'com-
mercial' speech, at least when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is
to be achieved through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the
dark. ' 81 Justice Thomas quoted his statements from 44 Liquormart with
approval in subsequent concurring opinions in Greater New Orleans
(1999), Lorillard (2001), and Thompson (2002).82 In Lorillard, he further
argued that, "when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in
order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate,
whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 'commer-
cial." 83 According to Justice Thomas, "there is no philosophical or his-
torical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than
'noncommercial' speech."'8 4
While acknowledging such criticisms of the Central Hudson test, the
Court continues to apply the Central Hudson analysis to government re-
76. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1995) (Stevens, J. concurring).
77. 517 U.S. at 501, 510-14 (joint opinion of Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
78. Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
571-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374-76 (2001) (plurality opinion).
80. 517 U.S. at 518.
81. Id. at 523.
82. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572, 575 (Thomas, J., concurring); Thomp-
son, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83. 533 U.S. at 572.
84. Id. at 575 (internal quotation omitted).
[Vol. 61
First Amendment Scrutiny
strictions on truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech.8 5 This may
change given recent developments in the composition of the Court. Re-
publican President George W. Bush recently appointed two new Justices
to the Court: Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. If
these Justices have a similar perspective on Central Hudson and the
Court's commercial speech doctrine as Justices Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Stevens (all appointed by Republican Presidents), then it is possible
that the Court will abandon the Central Hudson test and further increase
First Amendment scrutiny of commercial speech regulations. Those who
reject the argument that certain trademark laws fail Central Hudson scru-
tiny would have to concede that strict scrutiny analysis will be fatal for
many trademark laws regulating nonmisleading commercial speech.
Although some Justices advocate "repudiation of the Central Hudson
standard and implementation of a more straightforward and stringent test
for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial
speech, '86 these same justices have not argued in published opinions that
false or misleading commercial speech should receive constitutional pro-
tection. Language in past opinions suggests that a majority of the Court
is unlikely to conclude that untruthful commercial speech is protected by
the First Amendment.8 7 The categorical exclusion from First Amend-
ment protection for misleading commercial speech makes much of trade-
mark law constitutional, but it does not resolve every conflict between
trademark and free speech rights. Trademark laws are also applied by
courts to nonmisleading commercial speech and noncommercial speech.
B. TRADEMARKS AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Trademarks are used in both commercial and noncommercial speech.
As commercial speech is currently entitled to less First Amendment pro-
tection, classification of a trademark use as commercial or noncommer-
cial may be critical to a determination of the constitutionality of a
trademark law regulating that speech. As discussed above, commercial
speech is "usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction."88 The discussion below assumes this statement
defines commercial speech in the context of trademark law.89 Although
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to draw an exact line between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech in trademark disputes, use of a mark
85. E.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367-68; Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 183-84; 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 486-87 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
86. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184.
87. E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 (1976); see infra Part II.C.2.
88. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
89. Whether this is the proper definition of commercial speech in trademark cases is
beyond the scope of this Article. Some courts apply this definition of commercial speech
in trademark cases while interpreting the noncommercial use exemption in the federal di-




in commercial advertising and packaging for specific commercial prod-
ucts clearly fits within the definition of "pure commercial speech." Other
uses of a mark do not.
The expression is commercial when a word, name, symbol, or device is
used as a trademark to identify and distinguish the source of commercial
goods or services. 90 The trademark encourages consumers to enter into a
commercial transaction by providing information as to who is producing
or selling this commercial product advertised or sold under the mark.91
Like the use of a trade name, these source-identifying uses of a trade-
mark are pure commercial speech because the "purpose is strictly busi-
ness" and they "are used as part of a proposal of a commercial
transaction.
'92
Trademarks are also used in commercial speech in other ways. One
example is the use of trademarked descriptive terms in advertising or on
product packaging to describe the qualities or characteristics of products,
rather than identify their source. Other examples include use of the mark
to refer to the trademark holder in comparative advertising or advertising
for complementary goods or services, such as repair services. 93 A firm
may also use its competitor's mark in ads to parody the trademark holder,
its products, or its mark, such as MTD's parody of John Deere's deer logo
in a television advertisement, which showed an animated version of the
deer "pursued by [MTD's] Yard-Man lawn tractor and a barking dog." 94
Use of another's trademark to trigger the display of a commercial adver-
tisement on the Internet, such as a pop-up ad or sponsored link, is also a
commercial use of the mark.95 Most trademark disputes involve commer-
cial use of a mark that is identical or similar to another firm's trademark.
Some words are used as trademarks but are not commercial speech.
For example, political groups use trademarks, such as "United We Stand
America" or "MoveOn.org," 96 to identify the source of their activities
90. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 31:139; Denicola, supra note 5, at 193; Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 5, at 219.
91. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 ("Advertising... is... dissemination of infor-
mation as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price."); Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1137-38.
92. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) ("The use of trade names in connection
with optometrical practice, then, is a form of commercial speech and nothing more."); Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 2, §31:139 ("It would appear clear that a firm's trademark is the most
important element of commercial speech which is communicated to customers. All other
elements of advertising revolve around, relate to and are symbolized by the trademark.").
93. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968) (competitor's advertise-
ment for imitation perfume); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350,
352 (9th Cir. 1969) (automobile repair shop advertises it repairs Volkswagens).
94. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994).
95. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005).
96. United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 88
(2d Cir. 1997) (noting "United We Stand America" is a registered "service mark initially
used by the principal campaign committee for Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign");
U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,844,852 (cancelled) (registered by United We Stand America,
Inc. for "conducting voter registration drives, voter forums, polls and referendums in the
field of public policy, for non-business, non-marketing purposes; and issues and candidate
research activities and dissemination of information in the field of public policy"); U.S.
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and distinguish themselves from other organizations. Trademarks are
also used in other ways to convey noncommercial information or ideas.
Examples include unauthorized use of a trademark within the content of
news reporting, news commentary, consumer product reviews, and dic-
tionaries. When politicians use a trademarked term without authoriza-
tion to convey political ideas, such as "Change Rocks," 97 this is also
noncommercial speech, 98 even if the term is displayed on T-shirts and
other political memorabilia sold to the public by the political campaign.
In no way does this speech propose a commercial transaction.
Courts disagree on the boundary between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech in cases involving the entertainment industry's use of
words or logos claimed by others as trademarks in the titles or content of
artistic or literary expression. Examples include use of the "Barbie"
mark in the song and song title Barbie Girl by the rock band Aqua,99 use
of the trademarked word "Polo" for the title of a magazine Polo,a00 use of
the "Dr. Seuss" and "The Cat in the Hat" marks and Cat's stove-pipe hat
logo in the book The Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice about the
O.J. Simpson trial written in the style of Dr. Seuss,' 0 1 use of the "Spam"
mark for luncheon meat for the name of a wild boar Muppet "Spa'am" in
a children's film, 10 2 use of the "Michelob Dry" mark and related marks in
a fake magazine ad for "Michelob Oily" beer commenting on water pol-
lution, 10 3 use of L.L. Bean's marks in a sexually-oriented parody of the
L.L. Bean catalogue,10 4 use of the "Star Wars" marks in the pornographic
Trademark Reg. No. 3,166,180 (registered by MoveOn.org Civil Action Corporation for
"Organizing, planning, arranging and conducting events relating to politics, political cam-
paigns, media relations, public policy, leadership, networking, and the legislative process").
97. Moran Alterio, Scarsdale Teen Jilted by Obama's Slogan, JOURNAL NEWS, Jan. 10,
2008, at lA.
98. See, e.g., MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ.
6068, 2004 WL 434404, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding no infringement or dilution of the
marks when presidential candidate Ralph Nader used MasterCard's trademarks in a politi-
cal ad that criticized the other two presidential candidates); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v.
Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695-701 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing politician's use of
AFLAC's trademarks to criticize his opponent in a political campaign, including using a
duck similar to the AFLAC duck and the domain name www.taftquack.com).
99. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
the parody was noncommercial even though the song recording was commercially sold).
100. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 672 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that "a magazine title is a hybrid between commercial and artistic speech" and
noting the magistrate judge said the title was "commercial speech").
101. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403-06 (9th
Cir. 1997) (noting the use of Dr. Seuss's copyrighted works was "admittedly commercial"
and characterizing the trademark use as "commercial use").
102. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1996).
The issue of the noncommercial nature of the film was not mentioned in the opinion, but
the court did note the defendants planned to sell licensed products with scenes from the
film. Id. at 501.
103. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772-73, 778 (8th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the magazine's argument that the Missouri state anti-dilution statute could not
be applied to noncommercial speech).
104. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing this use was noncommercial).
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animated film parody Starballz,10 5 and use of the "Dairy Queen" mark in
the title of the film Dairy Queens about beauty pageants in the
Midwest.' 0 6
The fact that artistic and literary expression is sold for profit does not
make that expression per se commercial. 10 7 Newspapers and books are
sold commercially, but they are traditional noncommercial speech fully
protected by the First Amendment. 10 8 In Burstyn, the Court specifically
held "that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the
free speech and free press guaranty" in the Constitution even though the
production, distribution, and exhibition of a film "is a large-scale business
conducted for private profit."10 9 As Burstyn was decided in 1952 before
the Court held that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment
protection in 1976,110 the Burstyn Court implicitly characterized motion
pictures as noncommercial speech when it held this expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Unless the work is itself an advertise-
ment selling a specific commercial product,1 use of another's mark
within the content of artistic or literary expression should generally be
classified as noncommercial speech that is fully protected by the First
Amendment. When it is used in this context, the trademark clearly does
not propose a commercial transaction.112
The titles of artistic or literary works are also not "core" commercial
speech regardless of whether they contain words claimed as trademarks.
A title can be an integral part of the noncommercial expression. At most,
an artistic or literary title could be characterized as "hybrid" or "mixed"
speech with commercial and noncommercial components.11 3 An artistic
or literary title may encourage consumers to purchase the movie ticket,
song, or book. Yet a title is not pure commercial speech, even if it is used
105. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-01 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (concluding this parody was noncommercial speech exempted from liability under
federal dilution law).
106. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (D.
Minn. 1998) (characterizing this use of the mark as commercial).
107. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964). See generally David McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359 (1990).
108. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, at 1088.
109. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
110. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
111. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). It can be diffi-
cult to distinguish between commercial advertising and noncommercial speech, especially
when advertisements are creative and resemble traditional artistic or literary works in for-
mat or style. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 189, 237-46 (2006).
112. Artistic and literary works also do not fit within the broader definition of commer-
cial speech set forth in Central Hudson: "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience." Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (emphasis added).
113. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Titles, like the artistic works
they identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and commercial promo-
tion. The title of a movie may be both an integral element of the film-maker's expression
as well as a significant means of marketing the film to the public.").
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in advertising, because the title has an expressive function. When the
commercial and noncommercial aspects of speech are "inextricably inter-
twined," which is usually the case for titles,1 14 courts should evaluate the
constitutionality of restrictions of that speech using the "test for fully pro-
tected expression.
115
As discussed later in Part II.D.2., content-based restrictions of noncom-
mercial speech are usually subject to strict scrutiny analysis. Application
of trademark law to uses of marks within the content or titles of artistic or
literary works will likely not survive such heightened scrutiny. 116 If the
judges had used strict scrutiny analysis in the Dr. Seuss, Anheuser-Busch,
and American Dairy Queen cases, 117 they probably would have ruled for
the defendants rather than the plaintiffs on the trademark infringement
claims. Of course, it is possible the Supreme Court will adopt a less strin-
gent constitutional standard for trademark law or even craft a trademark-
specific First Amendment test to balance trademark and free speech
rights."t 8 The latter approach has been used by lower courts in disputes
over the unauthorized use of marks in artistic and literary expression.
Rather than apply strict scrutiny analysis, courts instead state that the
Lanham Act "should be construed to apply to artistic works only where
the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression."' 1 9 Under the "Rogers balancing test," a title
incorporating another's mark does not violate the Lanham Act "unless
the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if
it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work. 1 2 0 This test can protect speech in
114. E.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The names art-
ists bestow on their art can be part and parcel of the artistic message . . . . The fact that
Defendants use the Rosa Parks title in advertising does not automatically erase the expres-
sive function of the title and render it mere commercial exploitation; if a song is sold, and
the title is protected by the First Amendment, the title naturally will be 'inextricably inter-
twined' with the song's commercial promotion."); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998 (noting "[tihe
artistic and commercial elements of titles are inextricably intertwined" and holding that
"the expressive element of titles requires more protection than the labeling of ordinary
commercial products").
115. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see also DAVID S.
WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 328-31
(2002). Like a title, advertising that promotes noncommercial speech is hybrid speech with
commercial and noncommercial components. It is more commercial than a title, however,
because it is an advertisement and its primary purpose is to encourage the purchase of the
expression rather than to identify it. On the other hand, this speech is less commercial
than advertising for a commercial product. If the artistic and commercial elements of the
advertisement are inextricably intertwined, restrictions of that ad may also be evaluated
using the test for fully protected expression. Id.
116. See infra Part II.D.2.d.
117. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Am. Dairy Queen
Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
118. See infra Part II.D.2.d.
119. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
120. Id.; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2002)
(adopting the Rogers balancing test in a trademark action). Some courts applying the Rog-
ers balancing test hold that the likelihood of confusion must be particularly compelling to
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individual trademark cases, although it has limitations 121 and is more
likely to permit restrictions of protected speech than strict scrutiny
analysis.
Distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial uses of trade-
marks on T-shirts and other novelty or expressive merchandise is also
complicated because trademarks can serve different communicative func-
tions when displayed on merchandise. Context is important. As noted
above, the expression is commercial if the mark is used to identify the
source of the commercial product. Whether a certain use of trademarked
language on a T-shirt proposes a commercial transaction to a consumer
may depend on whether a reasonable consumer would think this lan-
guage is source-identifying rather than expressive in this context. The
display of a trademark symbol (® or TM) with the phrase suggests the
mark is being primarily used in a commercial manner to identify source.
The location of the mark on the T-shirt may also indicate whether the
expression is commercial. When trademarked words, such as "Nike,"
"San Diego Padres," "UCLA," "Life is Good," or "No Fear" are used on
the inside label of a T-shirt or a tag attached to the product to identify the
source or licensor of that merchandise, this is pure commercial speech.
The trademark use does no more than propose a commercial transaction
because it identifies the source or licensor of this merchandise, which may
induce consumers to purchase the product.
It is less clear that use of a trademark on merchandise is purely com-
mercial, however, if the trademarked language or logo is displayed prom-
inently on the front or back of the T-shirt. Expression is not inherently
commercial just because it appears on a T-shirt, hat, or other expressive
product sold to the public. Although trademark holders emblazon their
marks on the front of T-shirts for promotional purposes, this practice
does not make all expression on T-shirts commercial, especially when the
words consist of common phrases that communicate ideas, such as "Life
is Good" or "No Fear."'1 22 If a manufacturer obtained trademark rights
in the phrase "Freedom of Expression" for sportswear, and displayed this
term on the front of T-shirts, would the display of this identical phrase on
the front of T-shirts by third parties automatically be classified as com-
mercial speech? The answer should be no if we truly believe in freedom
of expression.
Unlike a trade name used on a sign to identify the source of services,1 23
one cannot assume that language displayed on the front of a T-shirt is
outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake. E.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA
Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th Cir. 2001); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l,
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir.1993).
121. McGeveran, supra note 11, at 56-64.
122. "Life is Good" and "No Fear" are registered marks for sportswear. See No Fear,
Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1381, 1381 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (noting the plaintiff
filed suit against producers of a film entitled "No Fear"); supra note 1 (citations relating to
the "Life is Good" litigation).
123. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n.10 (1979) (noting "the mere solicitation of
patronage implicit in a trade name").
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used "as a mark" or is commercial speech. A consumer may purchase the
merchandise because of the inherent meaning of the phrase claimed as a
mark or because that trademark has intrinsic value-the mark is the
product-not because it identifies the source or official sponsor of the
merchandise.1 24 As noted by one district judge, T-shirts often serve as
personal billboards in our culture "carrying phrases that convey meanings
that can range from entirely personal to political to humorous. ' 125 Like
T-shirts carrying messages advocating the legalization of marijuana, T-
shirts carrying messages incorporating another's trademark "are a me-
dium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the
First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold
rather than given away."'126 T-shirts can be a "vehicle of. . .ideas and
opinions" just like a newspaper. 127 Moreover, a message may reach a
different segment of the public when disseminated on T-shirts and other
expressive merchandise rather than in traditional media.
For all of these reasons, I believe expression publicly displayed on the
front or back of a T-shirt or other expressive merchandise should gener-
ally be characterized as pure noncommercial speech unless reasonable
consumers believe that language partly or primarily identifies the source
or licensor of the product. If the expression does not serve any source-
identifying function, it should be presumed noncommercial even if it is
sold for profit. If that language is partly or primarily source-identifying,
but still has an expressive function, it should be characterized as hybrid or
mixed speech. Where the noncommercial nature of the speech predomi-
nates, or the commercial and noncommercial components are inextrica-
bly intertwined, restrictions on that expression should be evaluated under
the test for fully protected expression.1 28 An example is the display on T-
shirts and other novelty merchandise of the terms "Walocaust" and "Wal-
Queda," which are parodies of Wal-Mart. 129 Although the Supreme
Court and Eighth Circuit thought differently, I also believe that use of the
term "Olympic" in the phrase "Gay Olympic Games" 130 and use of the
124. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Frag-
ile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999).
125. Juicy Couture, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7203, 2006 WL 1012939, at
*17-18 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 2006) (holding the T-shirt "slogans Wear Juicy, Juicy Pop Prin-
cess, Be Juicy, Juicy Girls Rule, and the Joy of Juicy" were not sufficiently distinctive for
trademark protection).
126. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.) (citing
Heffrom v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981)).
127. Id. at 1017 (stating that defendant's T-shirts "are to [the seller] what the New York
Times is to the Sulzbergers and the Ochses-the vehicle of her ideas and opinions").
128. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
129. E.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment after finding this "parodic work is
considered noncommercial speech and therefore not subject to Wal-Mart's trademark dilu-
tion claims, despite the fact that Smith sold the designs to the public on t-shirts and other
novelty merchandise").
130. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535, 539 (1987)
("In this case, the SFAA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and other items,
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Mutual of Omaha mark and Indian Head logo in the "Mutant of Omaha"
design to convey an anti-nuclear message 131 on T-shirts and other mer-
chandise should have been treated like noncommercial speech for pur-
poses of First Amendment analysis. If the source-identifying nature of
the expression predominates, only then should restrictions of this lan-
guage on T-shirts be subject to intermediate constitutional scrutiny under
Central Hudson.
Finally, in cases where the defendant uses a parodic or satirical varia-
tion of another's mark "as its own designation of source, i.e., as a trade-
mark," for commercial products such as Haute Diggity Dog's use of
"Chewy Vuiton" as a mark for dog toys, 132 this speech should be deemed
commercial speech. The defendant is clearly using this mark to identify
who is producing or selling a commercial product when it applies to regis-
ter the term as a mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or uses
trademark symbols (® or TM) with the phrase. This source-identifying ex-
pression, although humorous, is commercial and primarily proposes a
commercial transaction.
Although the boundaries between commercial and non-commercial ex-
pression are uncertain, classification of a trademark use as commercial or
noncommercial may be determinative on the issue of liability for some
trademark claims. Congress explicitly excluded "any noncommercial use
of a mark" from coverage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
("FTDA") 133 and the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
("TDRA"), and thus federal dilution law only applies to uses of trade-
marks in commercial speech.1 34 Courts have applied the noncommercial
all emblazoned with the title 'Gay Olympic Games.' The possibility for confusion as to
sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the SFAA sought to exploit the 'commer-
cial magnetism ... of the word given value in the USOC .... [T]he application of the Act[which banned use of the word to induce the sale of goods] to this commercial speech is not
broader than necessary ....").
131. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398, 402-03 & n.8-9 (8th Cir. 1987)(characterizing as "commercial" the defendant's use of plaintiff's marks "to market, adver-
tise, or identify [defendant's] services or products," and noting the injunction allowed the
defendant "to use the design in other ways-such as anti-nuclear pamphlets and the like").
132. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266-67 (4th
Cir. 2007); see also Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410,
415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("In this case, Nature Labs arguably uses an adaptation of the
Hilfiger mark[-"Timmy Holedigger" for pet perfumes-]for the dual purpose of making
an expressive comment and selling a non-competing product, an area where it has been
noted that line-drawing becomes rather difficult .... However, because the mark is being
used at least in part to promote a somewhat non-expressive, noncommercial product, the
First Amendment does not extend to such use, or to the extent that it does, the balance tips
in favor of allowing trademark recovery, if in fact consumers are likely to be confused ....
When a parodist makes trademark use of another's mark, it should be entitled to less
indulgence, even if this results in some residual effect on the free speech rights of commer-
cial actors.") (citations and footnotes omitted).
133. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
134. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)); 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006). The legislative history of the FT'DA suggests this provision
"expressly incorporates the concept of 'commercial' speech from the 'commercial speech'
doctrine, and proscribes dilution actions that seek to enjoin use of famous marks in 'non-
commercial' uses (such as consumer product reviews)." H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 8
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use exemption in dilution cases based on the use of trademarks in domain
names for cybergripe websites, 135 the titles or content of artistic or liter-
ary expression, 136 and political advertisements.
137
Other federal trademark statutes do not explicitly contain a "commer-
cial use" requirement or "noncommercial use" exemption. The noncom-
mercial nature of the trademark use is only one of several factors
considered for liability under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1999 ("ACPA"). 138 The federal trademark registration and
infringement statutes do not prohibit organizations from registering
trademarks, or from suing others or being sued, for trademark infringe-
ment when the mark is used in noncommercial speech.' 39 Although the
infringement statutes require use of the mark "in commerce," 140 some
courts and scholars believe this phrase is jurisdictional-Congress may
only regulate "commerce" within its control-and does not limit applica-
tion of federal trademark law to commercial speech.
14
'
Citing First Amendment concerns, a few courts have held that commer-
cial use of the mark is required for an infringement claim under the Lan-
ham Act.142 Others correctly note it is unclear from the legislative
history whether Congress intended to limit application of the Lanham
Act to commercial speech.1 43 Regardless of the legislature's true intent,
some courts have held the Lanham Act is not limited to commercial
speech and have applied trademark infringement statutes to uses of
trademarks in noncommercial speech, including political and religious ex-
(1995). This Article assumes Congress meant to exclude noncommercial speech in this
exemption. Whether this was its true intent is beyond the scope of this Article.
135. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc., 403 F.3d 672, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2005); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell,
368 F.3d 433, 438-40 (5th Cir. 2004); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
136. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2002); Mattel,
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media
Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-01 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
137. MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., No. 00 Civ. 6068, 2004 WL
434404, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
138. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
Under the ACPA, a markholder can sue a person who "registers, traffics in, or uses a
domain name" that is "identical or confusingly similar to" its distinctive mark, or "is identi-
cal or confusingly similar to or dilutive of" its famous mark, where that person has "a bad
faith intent to profit from" the plaintiff's mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000). The
defendant's "bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the
domain name" is one of nine nonexclusive factors relevant to the determination of whether
the defendant has such a bad faith intent. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
139. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). The dilution statute also requires use
of the mark or trade name "in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
141. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (stating the Lanham
Act "regulate[s] commerce within the control of Congress"); United We Stand Am., Inc. v.
United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1997); WELKOWITZ, supra
note 115, at 333-34.
142. E.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir. 2005); Taub-
man Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2003).
143. E.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2005); Semco, Inc. v.
Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1995).
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pression.144 It will be more difficult to prove government restrictions on
use of a mark are constitutionally justified if the speech is noncommer-
cial. The next Part explains why.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRADEMARK LAWS
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Failure to recognize the potential conflict between trademark law and
the First Amendment can harm protected speech and lead to more dubi-
ous assertions of trademark rights in language. It is easy to send a cease
and desist letter to a competitor claiming trademark rights in a common
word or phrase, such as "CyberLaw" for legal services, 145 "Pet Friendly"
for products and services for pets and pet owners,146 or "Beef Stick" or
"Turkey Stick" for food products. 147 Descriptive terms can be protected
as trademarks if they acquire distinctiveness and firms have sued to en-
force trademark rights in them, such as "Thirst Aid" for a beverage. 148
As it is difficult to know whether a court will find a term to be descriptive
or an unprotected generic term, the threat of a lawsuit may be sufficient
to deter further use of descriptive or generic terms claimed as trademarks
by competitors. Firms also sue to stop criticism or parody that incorpo-
rates their trademarks, such as Wal-Mart's lawsuit against the man who
used "Walocaust" and "Wal-Queda" on T-shirts and other novelty mer-
chandise. 149 Trademark law stifles protected speech if it restricts, or is
144. E.g., United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 92-93 (holding the Lanham Act's "use in com-
merce" language does not limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of a mark and ap-
plying the infringement statute to defendant's use of the mark "United We Stand
America" to associate itself with the political movement that sponsored Ross Perot's politi-
cal campaign); Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding use of the "Seventh-day Adventist" and "SDA" marks
by an unaffiliated church infringed the marks of the national religious organization).
145. Eric Menhart, an attorney at the law firm CyberLaw P.C. with a blog called
"CyberLawg," filed a trademark application on December 1, 2007 for the term
"CyberLaw" for legal services and asserted alleged trademark rights against Michael
Grossman, a Chicago attorney who runs a blog with the name "CyberBlawg." U.S. Trade-
mark Serial No. 77,341,910 (filed Dec. 1, 2007); Of CyberLaw and CyberLawg, http://www.
cyberlaw.pro/cyberlawg/general-interest/of-cyberlaw-andcyberlawg.html (Jan. 19, 2008)(stating that "[t]he firm issued one informal notice to one attorney, Michael Grossman,
about a potential dilution of the name of the firm's blog, CyberLawg(TM)"); see Posting of
Corynne McSherry to Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2008/01/cyberlaw-and-cyberlawgs (Jan. 18, 2008) ("Menhart has demanded that
attorney Michael Grossman change the title of his blog about technology law,
'CyberBlawg."').
146. See Letter from Pet Friendly, Inc. to Pet Friendly Travel (May 19, 2006) (posted at
http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=4156) (claiming rights in
registered mark "Pet Friendly" for pet products); Letter from Pet Friendly, Inc. to Pet
Friendly Rentals (Jan. 27, 2004) (posted at http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/
notice.cgi?NoticelD=1065).
147. Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Ill. 2007)(granting summary judgment to defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's registered
trademarks "Beef Stick" and "Turkey Stick" for food products were generic).
148. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1992).
149. E.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment after finding "a reasonable juror
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vague enough to possibly restrict, such expression about products, ser-
vices, or markholders. 15
0
The recipient of a cease and desist letter or complaint may opt to settle
the case and self-censor its speech rather than fight in court for the right
to use particular language because litigation is expensive and attorneys'
fees are only awarded in exceptional circumstances. In the Louis Vuitton
trademark lawsuit against Haute Diggity Dog based on its line of "Chewy
Vuiton" dog toys, newspapers reported the defendants spent more than
$300,000 in legal fees to achieve a favorable ruling in the Fourth Circuit;
the judges held this was a successful parody, not infringement or dilu-
tion.151 Bank of America sent a cease and desist letter to a small entre-
preneur who sells ceramic piggy banks on a website located at the domain
name www.piggybankofamerica.com and only backed off after it received
a well-researched reply from Stanford's Cyberlaw Clinic sent on behalf of
the entrepreneur.1 52 Many individuals and small firms will not be able to
find pro-bono representation, and cannot afford to pay an attorney a
large sum of money to protect their right of free expression. If a defen-
dant elects to litigate, the court may be reluctant to dispose of the case
early on a motion to dismiss because of factual questions in the case.
153
That means the dispute may not be resolved until after discovery at sum-
mary judgment or trial, which will be even more expensive.
Another problem for defendants is that the chance of success in trade-
mark litigation is uncertain. Evaluations of the distinctiveness of a de-
scriptive term, whether a mark is famous, and infringement or dilution
liability all depend on application of fact-specific multi-factor tests.
1 54
Trademark protection covers uses of marks that are identical and similar
could only find that Smith primarily intended to express himself with his Walocaust and
Wal-Queda concepts and that his commercial success was a secondary motive at most").
150. As noted by the Court, "[c]ompetition is deterred.., not merely by successful suit
but by the plausible threat of successful suit." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529
U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
151. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256-57,
263, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2007); Associated Press, Louis Vuitton Loses 'Chewy Vuitton' Appeal,
MSNBC (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21793188/.
152. Letter from Bank of America Corp. to Pei-Ling Ceramics (Oct. 21, 2002) (posted
at http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticelD= 460); Marjorie Heins, Fair
Use It or Lose It: Copyright Owners' Threats Erode Free Expression (May/June 2006), http:/
/www.fair.org/index.php?page=3066.
153. Burke v. Mars, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1330(DC), 2008 WL 2485524, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June
23, 2008) (declining to grant motion to dismiss false endorsement claim under the Lanham
Act because "[w]hether the M&M Cowboy characters were parodies of The Naked Cow-
boy... raises factual questions that are not for the Court to decide at this stage of the
litigation"); Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prod., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068,1075 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss on lack of distinctiveness grounds because whether
an alleged mark is generic or a descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning is a ques-
tion of fact); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because whether the parody is
sufficiently strong to destroy consumer confusion is an issue for the jury).
154. Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am., Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 2002)
(secondary meaning factors); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.




to the plaintiff's mark. 55 It may be difficult to anticipate how a judge or
jury will rule, especially if the mark is used in unsavory or unpopular
ways. The cost of litigation combined with unpredictable trademark laws
make it easy for markholders to use cease and desist letters and trade-
mark lawsuits to stifle competition 156 and generally chill speech protected
by the First Amendment. 157
Trademark statutes do contain some built-in First Amendment safe-
guards, but they are limited and do not sufficiently protect speech to-
day. 158 For this reason, legislatures and courts should increase First
Amendment scrutiny of trademark law. Legislators should revise trade-
mark statutes in ways that reduce the potential or actual harm to free
speech. Courts should interpret trademark claims narrowly to avoid a
conflict with the First Amendment. They also should not hesitate to ap-
ply constitutional analysis to a trademark law if a speech-protective inter-
pretation of the statute is contrary to the text or clear intent of Congress.
When First Amendment rights are at stake, courts should not simply de-
fer to the judgment of the legislature on the constitutionality of a stat-
ute.159 Courts serve as a check on the legislature in our constitutional
system; both branches of the government must confirm this trademark
regulation does not harm protected expression.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is
much criticized, 160 these "legal doctrines nevertheless are the daily stuff
of legal life, the concerns of students, lawyers, litigants, and judges work-
ing their way through First Amendment conflicts in real life.' 6' This
Article therefore applies the Court's current First Amendment doctrine
to trademark law and sets up a framework for evaluating possible objec-
tions to increasing First Amendment scrutiny of trademark law. In a First
Amendment challenge to a trademark law or injunction, the trademark
holder may argue: (A) the constitutional requirement of state action is
not satisfied in private civil trademark litigation; (B) this use of a trade-
mark is not "speech" within the coverage of the First Amendment; (C)
this trademark use is categorically excluded from First Amendment pro-
tection; or (D) this trademark regulation survives constitutional scrutiny.
Below, I introduce the relevant First Amendment doctrines and apply
them to trademark law. This framework applies to claims for trademark
155. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:20 (noting exact identity is not necessary between
confusingly similar marks).
156. See Kenneth Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 865 (2008).
157. See generally McGeveran, supra note 11.
158. Ramsey, supra note 11, at 147.
159. Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978).
160. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?
121-22 (2005); see generally Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regula-
tions of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993); Robert Post, Recu-
perating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995); Jed Rubenfeld, The
First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).




infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting under the Lanham Act and
state trademark statutes and common law, and it may also apply to other
laws that restrict the use of trademarks to communicate information or
ideas. 16 2
A. STATE ACTION
The state action doctrine provides that the U.S. Constitution generally
applies only to actions of the government and its officers and not to con-
duct by private parties. A trademark holder may argue there is no state
action that implicates the First Amendment when trademarks are en-
forced in civil litigation initiated by private citizens rather than govern-
ment officials. A few courts have concluded that the Constitution's state
action requirement is not satisfied in private trademark litigation.1 63 As
recently as 2007, one court found a defendant's constitutional argument
unpersuasive in a trademark dispute because it believed "government re-
straints on commercial speech" are "simply not present in an intellectual
property dispute between two private parties.1 164 This is incorrect.
There is state action in every trademark lawsuit. The First Amendment is
implicated anytime the government restricts speech, such as a law or
court order prohibiting speech, or significantly burdens speech by al-
lowing civil liability for expression. 165
In the paradigm trademark case, a private trademark holder sues a per-
son or business in federal or state court for violations of its trademark
rights under the relevant trademark statutes and common law. The plain-
tiff asks the court for damages and an injunction banning further use of
the mark by the defendant, among other remedies. The Constitution's
state action requirement is satisfied when federal and state legislatures
enact statutes that regulate the use of trademarks, and when courts enjoin
162. E.g., Utah Spyware Control Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40-201(1) (2005) (pop-up
ads); Alaska's Anti-Adware Law, ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.45.792, 45.45.794, 45.45.798 (Supp.
2005) (pop-up ads); Truth in Domain Names Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252B (2006) (domain
names). Thanks to Professor Eric Goldman for these examples.
163. E.g., Reddy Commc'ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633-34
(D.D.C. 1977); Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131,133-34 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
164. Empire Home Servs., L.L.C. v. Empire Iron Works, Inc., No. 05-CV-72584, 2007
WL 1218717, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2007 April 23, 2007) (denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on various grounds, including a First Amendment affirmative defense,
where plaintiff Empire Home Services owned the trademark "Empire Today" and sued
defendant Empire Iron Works based on its use of the slogan "Call Empire Today").
165. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996) (noting that
the First Amendment applies to state and local governments under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause); Cohen v. Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (hold-
ing "a private cause of action for promissory estoppel involves 'state action' within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment such that the protections of the First Amendment
are triggered"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (judicial enforcement
of Alabama state defamation claim was subject to constitutional scrutiny); cf Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) (assuming enforcement of right of
publicity claim was state action); ALEXANDER, supra note 160, at 120-23; see generally
LARRY ALEXANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND?
(1988); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, at 507-39, 956-70.
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the defendant from further use of a trademark and/or punish the defen-
dant based on its use of a trademark. 166 Even though "they are qualita-
tively and constitutionally distinct," government suppression of speech
and government enforcement of private suppression of speech are still
both state action.167 After New York Times v. Sullivan,168 judicial en-
forcement of civil trademark laws should be sufficient "state action" to
trigger First Amendment scrutiny even in suits initiated by private par-
ties.169 In Sullivan, the Court rejected the state's argument that the judg-
ment of Alabama courts in this private defamation lawsuit was insulated
from constitutional scrutiny: "Although this is a civil lawsuit between pri-
vate parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional
freedoms of speech and press.' 70 The government restriction on speech
may ultimately be constitutional, but it is still state action.' 71
Under some circumstances, however, a restriction on use of a trade-
mark can be purely private. For example, there is no state action when a
private party refuses to allow certain uses of a trademark on the In-
ternet. 172 A private website operator may prohibit the unauthorized use
of trademarks on its website. An Internet search engine provider, such as
Google, may refuse to allow advertisers to use certain trademarked terms
in the text of advertisements displayed near organic search results. While
some individuals or firms may complain that their First Amendment
rights are violated when they are prevented from using trademarks in
certain ways, there is no state action when private parties prohibit use of
a mark without government involvement. It is only when private parties
rely on the power of the state to restrict speech that the state action re-
quirement is met and the constitutional right of free expression is impli-
cated. Trademark holders concerned about a First Amendment challenge
to a trademark claim under federal or state law should consider pursuing
private enforcement of their trademark rights outside of the judicial
system.
The state action inquiry should be quite simple in trademark cases. If a
markholder files a lawsuit and asks the court to enjoin or punish the de-
fendant's use of a trademark, the state action requirement is satisfied.
While a speech restriction is more likely to be constitutionally suspect if
the decision to initiate litigation is made by government officials rather
166. Id.
167. See ALEXANDER, supra note 160, at 121-22.
168. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 76 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
169. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987); U.S.
Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 n.9 (3d Cir. 1981); MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§31:143; Denicola, supra note 5, at 190 n.146.
170. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265. The Court further said it "matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
statute .... The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." Id.
171. Cf Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668.
172. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1130-42 (2005).
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than private citizens, this fact is not relevant to the state action
determination.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT "SPEECH"
Trademark holders may also explicitly or implicitly argue that certain
uses of a trademark do not qualify as First Amendment "speech." They
may say the First Amendment is not implicated when courts enjoin or
punish use of a trademark to identify the source of a product, rather than
as part of a communicative message.173 Markholders may also argue that
the unauthorized use of their protected trade dress (such as product de-
signs or colors) or non-traditional trademarks (such as a scent mark) does
not qualify as "speech" because these marks do not contain words. In
cases involving the use of trademarks to trigger keyword advertising, the
markholder may contend this use of a mark is not "speech." If the First
Amendment does not apply to a restriction on the use of a trademark,
that regulation is only subject to "the negligible scrutiny of rationality
review. 1 74 For the reasons explained below, the First Amendment
should cover any use of a mark or trade dress that is actionable under
trademark law because the defendant is only liable if its use of the mark
or trade dress conveys a certain message to consumers-the government
perceives the harm to come from the content of that infringing or diluting
expression.
Most trademarks consist of language that not only falls within the dic-
tionary definition of "speech" but also indisputably communicates a mes-
sage. Trademarks can consist of words ("Nike"), names ("McDonald's"),
and symbols (the Nike swoosh logo) that identify the source or sponsor of
the product. When a firm uses a distinctive trademark to identify and
distinguish its products or services, it intends to convey (and likely con-
veys) information to consumers about the source of the product, among
other things. 175 A trademark, such as "Coca-Cola," can provide informa-
tion about who is manufacturing or selling this product, or about the
quality of products sold under this brand. A trademark may be used in a
domain name to identify the owner or operator of a certain website or
provide other information. All of these uses of a trademark are
"speech," regardless of whether the markholder or a third party uses the
mark to communicate in these ways. The trademark use may not be pro-
tected by the First Amendment-it may be misleading commercial
173. See SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates, 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430,
1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Yankee Publ'g. Inc. v.
News Am. Publ'g. Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
174. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explo-
ration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (2004).
175. Cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1979) (noting a trade name conveys
information about the price and nature of the services offered once "it acquires meaning
over a period of time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the name
and some standard of price or quality").
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speech (a topic discussed next)-but it is still "speech" within the cover-
age of the First Amendment. A trademark conveys a message to consum-
ers even when it is used in a brand name or domain name to identify the
source of a product, service, or website.
Some trademarks consist of symbols or devices, such as the distinctive
shape of a Coca-Cola bottle, 176 that are not traditionally characterized as
"language." Distinctive product colors, product packaging, product de-
signs, restaurant d6cor, and other trade dress may all qualify as protect-
able trademarks under the Lanham Act. Firms can even obtain
trademark rights in non-traditional trademarks, such as NBC's three
chimes or the scent of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread. 77 Although
trade dress and non-traditional trademarks may not consist of words, they
can still qualify as First Amendment speech depending on the
circumstances.
All forms of expression or communication-including spoken and writ-
ten language, as well as symbolic speech and expressive conduct-are
covered by the concept of freedom of speech.178 Among other things, the
Court has held that flag burning, armband wearing, and nude dancing all
qualify as "speech" under the First Amendment. 179 According to the
Court, the use of "symbolic speech" can be communicative and qualify as
speech within the First Amendment's scope if "[ain intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances
the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it."180
These criterion are generally satisfied when a trade dress or non-tradi-
tional trademark is used to communicate information regarding product
source to the public and thereafter acquires distinctiveness for the senior
user of that mark. Once it conveys a message regarding source, the trade
dress or mark is protectable under trademark law and use of this symbol
can qualify as "speech" under the First Amendment. Junior users of the
trade dress or mark are also engaging in First Amendment "speech"
when they use this protected symbol to communicate a message regard-
ing product source; the trademark use is only actionable if the fact-finder
determines it conveyed a message.
If a defendant argues or admits in trademark litigation that it had no
intent to communicate a message when it used a particular trade dress or
non-traditional trademark, the court may question whether a First
Amendment defense is available to the defendant. According to the Su-
preme Court, there can be no communicative "speech" without intent to
176. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
177. Id.
178. ALEXANDER, supra note 160, at 7-8.
179. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66
(1981).
180. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at
397, 403-04 (1989). Scholars have criticized this test. E.g., Post, supra note 160, at 1250-60.
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communicate by a speaker.18' A judge may conclude that a defendant
who claims no intent to communicate is not entitled to a First Amend-
ment defense. The better view is that the First Amendment is still impli-
cated in that trademark case if the government restricts this use of the
mark or trade dress because of the harm caused by the misleading or
diluting message it communicates. 82 As use of a trademark is only ac-
tionable infringement or dilution if it communicates a certain message to
the audience, the First Amendment should cover all actionable uses of a
trademark, even if the defendant is using the trade dress or non-tradi-
tional trademark randomly or for aesthetic reasons to attract consumers
to the product.
Courts may also question whether First Amendment "speech" is impli-
cated in trademark litigation involving the unauthorized use of trade-
marks to trigger keyword advertising on the Internet, such as sponsored
links or pop-up ads. Internet search engine providers like Google use the
trademark "behind the scenes" when they program computer software to
trigger sponsored links to be listed near the organic search results when
consumers type a particular trademarked term into the search box, such
as "American Airlines."'1 83 Because the defendant's use of the mark in
internal computer code is not visible to the audience, markholders may
argue that First Amendment speech is not implicated. This argument
should fail if this trademark use is actionable.
In keyword advertising cases, the Internet search engine provider and
advertiser are generally not liable unless their use of the trademark to
trigger keyword advertising communicates an infringing or diluting mes-
sage to consumers. The plaintiff usually argues that the defendant's use
of its mark to trigger a specific ad is actionable because it communicates
information about the relationship between the trademarked term and
this ad. It may inform the consumer that the trademark holder is the
source or sponsor of the ad, the advertiser is a competitor of the trade-
mark holder, or the advertiser's product is a substitute for the trade-
marked product, among other things. 184 If it is actionable under
trademark law, use of another firm's trademarks to trigger sponsored ads
is "speech" within the coverage of the First Amendment. Application of
trademark law implicates the First Amendment because the court is regu-
181. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11; cf State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809,811 (Iowa 1971)(affirming the conviction of a defendant for wearing a flag as a poncho in part because the
defendant testified he "had no purpose" in wearing the garment); see SMOLLA, supra note
161, § 11:4.
182. Cf SMOLLA, supra note 161, § 1:6 (arguing that a homeless person who burned a
flag for warmth "could not be prosecuted under a flag-desecration statute, even if his burn-
ing of the flag was not intended as expression," where a flag desecration law is explicitly
content-based and not just an anti-burning law). Thanks to Larry Alexander for his discus-
sions with me on this issue, among others.
183. Complaint at 38, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-00487 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 16, 2007).
184. See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY
L.J. 507, 521-25, 540-41 (2005).
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lating this use of the mark due to its communication of a message deemed
harmful by the government.
C. CATEGORICAL EXCEPTIONS TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Even though they are government regulations of First Amendment
speech, trademark laws are constitutional when they restrict certain types
of speech categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. As ex-
plained below, trademarks do not generally fall into such a category.
Misleading commercial speech does, but not every infringing commercial
use of a mark is misleading commercial speech.
1. No Categorical Exception for Trademarks
Trademarks are not currently a type of speech that is categorically un-
protected by the First Amendment. Speech is generally presumed to
have "high" value, and is fully protected by the Constitution, unless it
falls within one of the "low" value categories of speech that is entitled to
lesser or no First Amendment protection.185 As noted by Professor Bol-
linger, "'high' value speech is virtually ensured protection against govern-
ment regulation directed at its 'content." 18 6 Examples include political
speech, scientific and academic speech, art, and literature. "Low" value
speech can be prohibited entirely, such as incitement of illegal activity,
fighting words, obscenity, and child pornography, 187 or can be regulated
more easily by the government based on its content, such as non-obscene
sexually explicit material, profanity,188 and defamation.18 9 The Court has
said that these categories of speech "can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content."1 90 The Court is unlikely to (and should not) conclude that
trademarks are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.
By themselves, trademarks generally are harmless, unlike child pornog-
raphy. Trademarks are just words, names, symbols, or devices, or combi-
nations of these, that are used to quickly and easily identify the source of
a product, among other uses. Although Friedman suggests that trade
names (and thus trademarks) are not as valued as political speech or even
185. Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 9 (L. Bollinger & G. Stone
eds., 2001).
186. Lee C. Bollinger, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 185, at 17 (dis-
cussing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713 (1971)).
187. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
188. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-
48 (1978); Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976); see also CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra note 67, at 1036-44 (discussing "indecent" speech).
189. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974).
190. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). These content-based speech




other types of commercial speech, such as price or product advertising, 19 1
the Court's main concern in that case was that trade names would be used
"to mislead the public. 1 92 Similarly, it is only when trademarks are used
in certain ways by certain speakers that this speech is harmful and lacks
value, such as misleading commercial uses of trademarks. At most, the
Court is likely to say that trademarks are speech that is protected by the
First Amendment but subject to more regulation than other types of fully
protected speech.193 The Court currently uses this approach for nonmis-
leading commercial speech. 194
Of course, the Court might instead decide to treat trademarks like
other language deemed outside the boundaries of the First Amendment
for various political, economic, social, and cultural reasons. 195 As noted
by Professor Schauer,
Little case law and not much more commentary explain why the con-
tent-based restrictions of speech in the Securities Act of 1933, the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the law of fraud, conspiracy law, the law of
evidence, and countless other areas of statutory and common law do
not, at the least, present serious First Amendment issues.196
In many cases involving legal control of speech, "the First Amendment
does not even show up in the analysis. 1 97
While the Court has not evaluated the constitutionality of trademark
law, it has never said trademarks are categorically outside the boundaries
of the First Amendment. To the contrary, the Court applied First
Amendment scrutiny (albeit weak intermediate scrutiny) to a law pro-
tecting trademark-like rights in the word Olympic and related symbols.198
Recently, in a case involving the scope of the fair use defense in trade-
mark law, the Court mentioned "the undesirability of allowing anyone to
obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grab-
bing it first." 199 In addition, the legislative history of the Lanham Act
suggests at least some members of Congress believe the First Amend-
ment constrains trademark law, as House and Senate reports contain ref-
191. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (holding a trade name is "a form of
commercial speech that has no intrinsic meaning" and thus is significantly different from
advertising that contains statements about the price and quality of the products or ser-
vices). Per the Court, a trade name is implicitly only a "mere solicitation of patronage" - it
simply proposes a commercial transaction. Id. at 11 n.10.
192. Id. at 13-16.
193. See infra Part II.D.2.d.
194. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
195. Schauer, supra note 174, at 1765.
196. Id. at 1768; see also BARENDT, supra note 43, at 254-55; Robert Post, Reconciling
Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra
note 185, at 162; David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416, 1416-17
(2005); Post, supra note 160, at 1250-60.
197. Schauer, supra note 174, at 1765.
198. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536-41 (1987).




erences to this constitutional provision. 200
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently refused to hold that another
type of intellectual property-copyright-is completely outside the
boundaries of the First Amendment. In Eldred, the Court rejected the
argument that copyright law is categorically immune from a First Amend-
ment challenge. 20 1 As Congress's power to regulate trademarks comes
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and not a specific consti-
tutional provision (unlike copyright law), 202 it is unlikely the Court will
conclude trademark law-but not copyright law-is categorically ex-
cluded from constitutional scrutiny. There should be a strong presump-
tion in favor of First Amendment coverage of trademarks to avoid
suppressing or chilling protected speech. 20 3 As trademarks convey infor-
mation about the source of products or services, among other things,
courts should conclude that trademarks are generally within the bounda-
ries of the First Amendment even if they conclude trademarks are less
protected than political speech.
2. Misleading Uses of Trademarks in Commercial Speech
While trademarks are generally protected by the First Amendment,
misleading use of a trademark in commercial speech is not.20 4 As noted
in Part I.A., the government may regulate misleading commercial speech
without violating the First Amendment. 20 5 The misleading commercial
speech exception can quickly dispose of a First Amendment challenge in
many core trademark infringement disputes between competitors. 20 6 Yet
due to the protection of trademark rights in descriptive terms and the
expansion of trademark infringement law to new areas of confusion,
200. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, 8 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S19306-10, S19310-12
(daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. H14317-01, H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995).
201. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). At the same time, the Court refused
to engage in further First Amendment scrutiny of the Copyright Term Extension Act be-
cause "Congress ha[d] not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection." Id.
Professor McKenna believes "the Eldred decision seems to have placed copyright predomi-
nantly outside the First Amendment scheme, at least as long as Congress does not alter the
'traditional contours of copyright protection."' McKenna, supra note 6, at 17-18.
202. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
203. Cf BARENDT, supra note 43, at 256, 405; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 281 (1981) (noting "per-
haps the preferable course is to begin with the presumption that all communication is cov-
ered by the first amendment and then create areas of noncoverage, regarding which the
burden of proof of nonapplicability of first amendment principles can be met").
204. As noted by Professor Post, "[i]t is not clear whether misleading speech is simply
'commercial speech' that can be regulated by the state, or whether it is instead excluded
even from the category of 'commercial speech.'" Post, supra note 53, at 21; see also
Schauer, supra note 174, at 1776 n.49 (suggesting that "misleading commercial advertise-
ments are akin to legally obscene materials in that they are regulable under minimal ra-
tional basis scrutiny without regard to First Amendment standards or values").
205. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("Misleading advertising may be prohib-
ited entirely."); Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (noting the government "may
ban commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further justification").
206. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 31:142 ("In the run-of-the-mill civil trademark




some courts now find infringement when the speech is not sufficiently
misleading to justify categorical exclusion from First Amendment
protection.
After finding trademark infringement, many courts quickly dispense of
a First Amendment challenge in a cursory analysis by stating that
"[clommercial speech may be regulated when its content is otherwise
false or misleading. ' 20 7 I believe the misleading commercial speech ex-
ception should not be applied automatically and rigidly in trademark
cases without considering why this type of speech is categorically ex-
cluded from First Amendment protection. Not all infringing commercial
uses of a mark meet the First Amendment's high threshold of "mislead-
ing." In such cases, the restriction must satisfy intermediate constitu-
tional scrutiny. The circumstances must warrant application of this
extraordinary exception to First Amendment scrutiny.
According to the Court, there are specific reasons why the government
can ban misleading commercial speech so easily. "Untruthful speech,
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake."'20 8
"The First Amendment ... does not prohibit the State from insuring that
the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely."
20 9
According to the Court, "there can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the
public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of commu-
nication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it. .. -21o Ra-
tional consumers prefer not to receive or rely on false or misleading
commercial information. Many regulations of untruthful commercial
speech would likely satisfy constitutional analysis if they were subjected
to it, so the Court may believe it is more efficient to characterize mislead-
ing commercial speech as a categorical exception to First Amendment
scrutiny and avoid this complicated and time-consuming analysis.
207. E.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021-22 (9th
Cir. 1985) (noting "[s]ubstantial evidence was presented at trial to show that [defendant's]
use of the words 'shift' and 'kit' was misleading") (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-73 (1976)); see also E & J Gallo Winery
v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, No. 06-
2341-JAR, 2008 WL 755069, at *31 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2008) (granting plaintiff summary
judgment on the First Amendment affirmative defense because "the Government may
constitutionally regulate 'deceptive or misleading' commercial speech") (citing S.F. Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987)); Kelley Blue Book v. Car-
Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the First Amendment
defense lacked merit because "substantial evidence was introduced at trial indicating that
defendants' use of their '1-900-BLU-BOOK' and '1-800-BLUE-BOOK' designations is
misleading in that it is likely to cause confusion among consumers"). Some courts do en-
gage in a more detailed discussion of the misleading nature of the commercial speech.
E.g., HER, Inc. v. RE/MAX First Choice, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(granting request by real estate firm and members for preliminary injunction to prevent
competitor from using Internet domain names incorporating personal names and regis-
tered marks of plaintiffs).
208. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
209. Id. at 771-72.




In the trademark law context, courts should consider why this infring-
ing speech should be labeled "misleading commercial speech," especially
if it is unclear whether the speech restriction would actually satisfy First
Amendment scrutiny. 211 Courts should ask if this use of a mark is a form
"of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform
it. ' '2 12 If this use of a trademark contains "accurate commercial informa-
tion" 213 rather than a misleading or "false statement of fact" that has "no
constitutional value, '214 courts should not classify that speech as
misleading.
In other contexts outside of trademark law, the Court has attempted to
explain what it means by "misleading" speech in its commercial speech
doctrine. The Court has distinguished between speech that is actually or
inherently misleading, and potentially misleading commercial speech. 215
Commercial speech is "actually misleading" where the record contains
actual evidence of deception.216 The speech is "inherently misleading"
when "the particular method by which the information is imparted to
consumers is inherently conducive to deception and coercion. ' 217 If "ad-
vertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that
a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive,"
the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment.21 8 If the speech is
only "potentially misleading," any restriction of that speech must satisfy
the remaining three factors of the Central Hudson test.219 The Court has
said the government "may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information... if the information also may
be presented in a way that is not deceptive .... ",220
In trademark law, proof of actual confusion by consumers is not neces-
sary for a finding of infringement.221 Moreover, like advertising of legal
services, 222 use of language claimed as a mark by another is not "inher-
211. For an excellent discussion of the differences between false advertising law and
trademark law, and some implications for trademark law if courts apply real First Amend-
ment scrutiny to trademark law, see generally Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Com-
mercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 737 (2007).
212. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
213. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996).
214. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[Tjhere is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.");
see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984).
215. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm., 496 U.S. 91,100 (1990) (plu-
rality); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 643-47 (1985); see also Katsky v. Nike, 27 Cal.
4th 939, 954 (2002) (noting the United States Supreme Court has drawn this distinction).
216. Peel, 496 U.S. at 106.
217. Id. at 112 (Marshall, J. & Brennan, J., concurring)
218. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202.
219. Id. at 203.
220. Id. (emphasis added), quoted in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Comm., 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (plurality).
221. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:12 (citing cases).
222. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1977) ("We are not persuaded
that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be misleading."); see also
[Vol. 61
First Amendment Scrutiny
ently misleading. '223 As infringement doctrine has expanded beyond
confusion regarding the source of products and services, courts may find
that there is a likelihood of confusion where the trademark use is only
potentially misleading and not inherently conducive to deception. Cer-
tain types of confusion, such as confusion regarding sponsorship or ap-
proval of expression incorporating another's mark, may be more likely to
convey constitutionally valuable information and ideas than harm the
public in any material way. Courts should be wary about labeling all in-
fringing commercial uses of trademarks "misleading," as this could sup-
press or chill nonmisleading commercial speech. While the Court has
said it is easier to determine the truth or falsity of commercial speech
compared to other types of speech-it said the truth of commercial
speech is "more easily verifiable by its disseminator" 224-that is not the
case for uses of trademarks alleged to be infringing. Without conducting
a consumer survey and engaging in fact-intensive discovery, a company
may not know whether its mark is likely to cause confusion with another
firm's mark. The Court has correctly noted that "distinguishing deceptive
from nondeceptive advertising in virtually any field of commerce may re-
quire resolution of exceedingly complex and technical factual issues and
the consideration of nice questions of semantics. '225 Use of a trademark
is not like advertising about price or product qualities, where the truth of
the commercial representation may actually be objectively verifiable. 226
As noted by Professor Austin, "Implying that the First Amendment is
Peel, 496 U.S. at 100 (noting the attorney's "letterhead was neither actually nor inherently
misleading").
223. Although the Court in Friedman noted that "there is a significant possibility that
trade names will be used to mislead the public" due to "ill-defined associations of trade
names with price and quality information" that could "be manipulated by the users of
trade names," Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979), this case involved a state ban
on optometrists advertising and using trade names rather than personal names, not a ban
on unauthorized infringing use of one firm's mark by a third party. It should be limited to
its facts and not used to conclude that infringing use of a mark is always misleading. The
Court discounted the communicative value of trade names in that case. The case might
come out differently today, as the Court more recently said: "If the 'protections afforded
commercial speech are to retain their force,'. . . we cannot allow rote invocation of the
words 'potentially misleading' to supplant the [government's] burden to 'demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree."' Ibanez v. Fla. Dept. of Business and Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994) (cita-
tions omitted). Governmental "concern about the possibility of deception in hypothetical
cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over con-
cealment." Peel, 496 U.S. at 111.
224. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976). This statement has been criticized by scholars. E.g., BARENDT, supra note
43, at 399 (noting that much commercial advertising and marketing today contains little
verifiable factual content).
225. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 645 (1985).
226. Bose, 466 U.S. at 504 n.22 ("Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually
,seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service he himself provides
and presumably knows more about than anyone else,'. . . there is a minimal 'danger that
governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill accu-
rate and nondeceptive commercial expression"') (quoting Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772
n.24, 777); Tushnet, supra note 211, at 739.
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safe from trademark law because trademark law prohibits only those uses
of marks that are likely to cause confusion puts enormous faith in tests
for trademark infringement, faith that might not always be warranted.122 7
There are other reasons why it is troubling to conclude that infringing
use of a mark is always "misleading" speech. Sometimes only a small
percentage of consumers surveyed-less than twenty percent-are con-
fused by the defendant's speech.228 For example, only twelve percent of
consumers surveyed were confused regarding Mutual of Omaha's spon-
sorship of the anti-nuclear message "Mutant of Omaha" displayed on T-
shirts.2 29 When a large percentage of consumers surveyed-a majority-
are not confused, it is problematic to avoid further constitutional scrutiny
of a law that prohibits this expression. Speech should also not be labeled
"misleading" under the First Amendment when the government may be
partly responsible for making that trademark use misleading. Distinctive-
ness of a descriptive term used as a trademark and consumer confusion
regarding source or sponsorship all depend on the perceptions of con-
sumers.230 Yet trademark law can influence what consumers think. The
government's past trademark protection for descriptive terms and strong
enforcement of trademark rights in a variety of contexts outside the core
of trademark law may be the reason certain trademarks are now distinc-
tive or certain uses of a trademark are now confusing.231 In such circum-
stances, the government and trademark holders should not be able to
avoid the burden of proving real harm by simply invoking the misleading
commercial speech exception.
For all of these reasons, courts in trademark cases should only conclude
that infringing commercial use of a mark is "misleading" under the First
Amendment if the trademark use is actually misleading or inherently
likely to mislead reasonable consumers and the speech has "no constitu-
tional value. '232 An example of misleading commercial speech would be
a competitor's confusing use of the "Coca-Cola" mark as a brand name
for its own low-quality soft drink. If use of another's mark is only poten-
tially misleading and/or has some positive communicative value to con-
227. Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies
and Fair Use, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 157, 186 (2008).
228. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:185.
229. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987); Id. at 404(Heaney, J., dissenting); see also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540
F.2d 266, 278-79 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversing a directed verdict for the defendant where a
survey established that fifteen percent of consumers were confused regarding sponsorship
by plaintiff).
230. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 907-27 (2007); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of
Source, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfmabstractid= 1088479#PaperDownload; Ramsey, supra note 11, at 1150.
231. Id.
232. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984)
("Though false and misleading commercial speech could be deemed to represent a cate-
gory of unprotected speech .... ,the rationale for doing so would be essentially the same as
that involved in the libel area, viz, 'there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact."') (quoting Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
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sumers, this speech-even if confusing to some-does not rise to the level
of "misleading" commercial speech that is automatically refused First
Amendment protection. 233 In such cases, further constitutional scrutiny
of the trademark restriction is required because the speech also conveys
useful information or ideas to consumers. Examples of the types of in-
fringement claims to which the categorical exception for misleading com-
mercial speech should not apply include cases involving the accurate
descriptive use of trademarked terms, keyword advertising, and use of a
mark in commercial commentary, parody, and satire to express some-
thing unrelated to the identification of the source of the defendant's
products or services.
When another's trademark is used without authorization to accurately
describe the qualities or characteristics of the defendant's products, that
use of the mark should never rise to the level of "misleading" speech
regardless of whether the term is used as part of a brand name, slogan,
domain name, or in other ways deemed to be use "as a mark. ' 234 Even if
some consumers are confused by this use of the trademarked term, the
descriptive words provide useful information to other consumers about
the attributes of the defendant's product. 235 This commercial speech has
constitutional value and thus does not meet the high threshold of "mis-
leading" speech that is categorically unprotected by the First
Amendment. 236
It is also not "misleading" under the First Amendment when words
claimed as trademarks are used to trigger pop-up ads or sponsored links
on the Internet. Keyword advertising can result in the display of compar-
ative ads, communicate information about goods or services related to
the markholder, or provide commentary regarding the trademark holder
and its products. This is all useful information to consumers. 237 It has
"constitutional value" even if it confuses some consumers, including
those consumers who believe the law grants markholders control over
233. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) (noting "the
public's interest in receiving accurate commercial information" is an "interest that supports
regulation of potentially misleading advertising" yet also "supports an interpretation of the
First Amendment that provides constitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate
and nonmisleading commercial messages") (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
234. To qualify for the fair use defense, the defendant's use of the descriptive term must
be "a use, otherwise than as a mark." 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (2000); see also, e.g., Sands,
Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the defendant was not entitled to the fair use defense because it used the plaintiff's mark
"Thirst Aid" as an attention-getting symbol in advertising and not in a sentence describing
Gatorade's sports drink); Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1167-69 (explaining why this defense is
limited).
235. Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1148-52; Tushnet, supra note 211, at 748-49 (noting that
protecting trademark rights in descriptive terms that have acquired secondary meaning
may result in the suppression of partially useful information and chill speech).
236. Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1148-52; Ibanez v. Fla. Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg., 512
U.S. 136, 145-46 (1994); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm., 496 U.S. 91,
100-11 (1990); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
237. See Rothman, supra note 9, at 158.
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most uses of their trademarks. Neither current trademark law nor the
First Amendment answers the policy question of whether the markholder
or Internet search engine provider should profit from keyword advertis-
ing that uses trademarked words. Yet the First Amendment does require
consideration of the effect on expression of a trademark injunction ban-
ning unauthorized use of trademarked language in keyword advertising.
If given total control over this use of their marks, many trademark hold-
ers are unlikely to license their marks to trigger comparative advertise-
ments, negative commentary, parody, or satire incorporating the mark.
Especially where the trademark consists of common words (such as
American Airlines), and is not a fanciful term, expression is harmed if
courts automatically label infringing use of that term "misleading" and
refuse to engage in further constitutional scrutiny of this speech
restriction.
Moreover, a conclusion that commercial speech is "misleading"-and
therefore categorically excluded from First Amendment protection-is
very troublesome when the finding of infringement is based only on ini-
tial interest confusion on the Internet. In some cases, courts find in-
fringement where consumers are only initially confused regarding the
trademark holder's affiliation with the triggered ad.238 If this confusion is
dispelled upon viewing the ad or website, it is problematic to call this use
of the mark "misleading" speech because the harm (if any) to consumers
is minimal.239 The value of this use of the mark may be high and may
inform the public rather than deceive it.240 The misleading commercial
speech exception should not be used to avoid constitutional analysis of
the doctrine of initial interest confusion.
Use of another's mark to express commentary, parody, or satire on
clothing and other expressive merchandise should also not be deemed
"misleading" speech (and may also not be commercial speech) where it
does not cause confusion regarding the product source.241 Third parties
may use a variation of another's trademark to poke fun at or comment on
the trademark holder or society, or otherwise convey a humorous mes-
sage, rather than identify the source of the product. Examples include
use of the General Electric mark in the pun "Genital Electric" displayed
on T-shirts and underwear 242 and use of a design similar to the American
238. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), affid, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282
(D.N.J.), aff'd 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
239. Cf. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 318 n.6 (4th Cir. 2005) (The court thought
the Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus cases "were wrongly decided to the extent that
in determining whether the domain names were confusing, the courts did not consider
whether the websites' content would dispel any confusion. In expanding the initial interest
confusion theory of liability, these cases cut it off from its moorings to the detriment of the
First Amendment.").
240. See Rothman, supra note 9, at 158.
241. See supra Part I.B.
242. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (finding
infringement of General Electric logo).
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Express card design, slogan "Don't Leave Home Without It," and other
marks of American Express Company on "condom card" packaging for
condoms with the phrase "Never Leave Home Without It."'243 Although
a clever pun incorporating another's mark may just be funny and not as
valued as political speech, humorous expression is not excluded from the
protection of the First Amendment. All of these uses of a mark can have
value even if some consumers are confused regarding whether the
markholder consented to this use of the mark. Confusion about sponsor-
ship or approval by the markholder in such circumstances should not sat-
isfy the high threshold of misleading speech because this speech has
constitutional value that should be balanced against the markholder's
trademark rights and any real harm caused by this expression.
When a trademark use is infringing but not misleading commercial
speech, courts will need to engage in a more nuanced analysis of the con-
stitutionality of the law or injunction before they allow the plaintiff to
prevail. Moreover, the burden of proof on the misleading or commercial
nature of the speech should remain with the trademark holder or the gov-
ernment.244 In some cases, the court has erroneously stated that the bur-
den of proof was on the defendant when it raised a First Amendment
challenge, probably because the First Amendment was listed as an "af-
firmative defense. '245 Unless convinced otherwise, courts should pre-
sume the speech is nonmisleading and/or noncommercial-not the other
way around. These classifications will lead to increased constitutional
scrutiny of the trademark regulation and will better protect the free flow
of commercial and noncommercial expression.
D. FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
If a trademark use is not misleading commercial speech categorically
excluded from constitutional protection, then the U.S. Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence requires courts to subject the trademark
law or injunction to constitutional scrutiny if the defendant raises a First
Amendment challenge and the court rules for the plaintiff. As explained
243. Am. Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006, 1989 WL
39679 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting preliminary injunction due to likelihood of success on
claim under New York anti-dilution law).
244. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-71 (1993); Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985) (stating "the free
flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regula-
tors the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading,
and the harmless from the harmful"). The government should not be able to simply assert
this commercial speech is misleading. See Tushnet, supra note 211, at 744-47.
245. E.g., Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR, 2008 WL 755069, at *30-31 (D. Kan.
Mar. 19, 2008) (stating that "defendants have the ultimate burden of proof" on the affirma-
tive defenses and failed "to meet their burden of coming forward with specific facts that
would demonstrate genuine issues of material fact on the essential elements of any of these
affirmative defenses," including the affirmative defense that defendants' "use of the marks
at issue is protected by the First Amendment"; the court granted summary judgment to




below, the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny usually depends
on the type of speech (for example, nonmisleading commercial speech) or
the type of regulation of speech (for example, a content-based regulation
of noncommercial speech). 246 Courts may also consider whether a trade-
mark injunction is a prior restraint of speech, or whether the trademark
law is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Constitutional analysis of trademark law requires an inquiry into the
government's reasons for regulating this expression. For speech restric-
tions to be constitutional, the government interest must generally be
"substantial" for commercial speech and "compelling" for noncommer-
cial speech. 247 For this reason, legislatures and courts should clearly ar-
ticulate the purpose of each new trademark statute or common law
trademark doctrine. In Section 45 of the Lanham Act, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1127, Congress explicitly set forth its "intent" in regulating
trademarks:
The intent of this chapter is [1] to regulate commerce within the con-
trol of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading
use of marks in commerce; [2] to protect registered marks used in
such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation;
[3] to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair com-
petition; [4] to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the
use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of
registered marks; and [5] to provide rights and remedies stipulated
by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and
unfair competition entered into between the United States and for-
eign nations.248
Regardless of whether this provision embodies Congress's actual legisla-
tive purpose when it passed the Lanham Act and made subsequent revi-
sions to it, this paragraph contains some evidence of Congress's intent in
regulating trademarks. 249
In trademark disputes, the Supreme Court has examined the legislative
history of the federal trademark statute to determine its purpose and con-
cluded that "[t]he Lanham Act provides national protection of trade-
marks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among
competing producers. '250 It also said "[n]ational protection of trade-
marks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster com-
petition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the
246. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 185, at 9.
247. See infra Part II.D.1&2.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
249. See Edward S. Rogers, Introduction to, DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADEMARK
MANUAL (1947), at xiv-xxi ("Here we have a direct statement of a national policy by the
Congress.") (quoted in Application of Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp, 297 F.2d 947, 952
(CCPA 1962) (Rich, J., concurring) (noting that Edward S. Rogers was one of the chief
architects of the Lanham Act).
250. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (citing S. Rep. No.
1333, at 3, 5 (1946)).
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benefits of a good reputation. '251 Scholars and jurists note that the stan-
dard economic arguments for protecting trademarks include the benefit
of reduced consumer search costs and the creation of incentives for
markholders to maintain and improve product quality.25 2 Some courts
believe that markholders have property (or quasi-property) rights in their
distinctive trademarks, and the government should protect such property
interests from unauthorized use by third parties.253
Although the Supreme Court was concerned about free riding on the
goodwill invested in the Olympic word and symbols in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics,254 it is not clear the Court would hold today that prohibiting
free riding on the goodwill in a trademark is a substantial goal where use
of the mark is not misleading. 255 The Court may have accepted the gov-
251. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 1333, at 4).
252. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRucTuRE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168,
173 (2003); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2101, 2105-08 (2004); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Public-
ity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1197 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan
& Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 11 Hous. L.
REV. 777, 790 (2004); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 124, at 493; see generally Daniel
Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1759 (2006); J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or
Facts?, 41 Hous. L. REV. 713, 727-28 (2004).
253. E.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.. 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) ("Plaintiff's property right in its mark clearly extends to its reproduction and publi-
cation in advertising and for other promotional uses regarding its products."). This trade-
mark goal is used by some to justify dilution laws. As noted by Professor Austin, "dilution
doctrine seems more palatable from a policy perspective if it does something positive for
consumers rather than just protecting the property interests of proprietors of famous trade-
marks." Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 891 n.276 (2004). Professor Pollack argues that courts concerned about property
rights should also consider the public "ownership interest in the communicative power of a
trademark" when marks "become communicative symbols standing for something besides
the source or sponsorship of the product in whose service they originated." Malla Pollack,
Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain-
With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1391, 1393 (1993). According to the Court, "a property interest in a means of communica-
tion does not enlarge or diminish the First Amendment protection of that communication."
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1979).
254. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539-41 (1987)
(quoting Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40). According to Profes-
sor Welkowitz, "The [SFAA] Court clearly believed that dilution protection, at least in
some contexts, is permitted by the First Amendment." WELKOWITZ, supra note 115, at
333.
255. Free riding off of the goodwill in another's mark can be procompetitive if a com-
petitor's use of the mark is not misleading. See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits
and the Demise of "Trademark Use, " 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 393, 417-18 (2006); Mark
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033-69
(2005); Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 455-61 (1999). Ac-
cording to a recent plurality of the Court, "[iJt is the State's interest in protecting consum-
ers from 'commercial harms' that provides the 'typical reason why commercial speech can
be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.' Yet bans that
target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect consumers from such
harms. Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an 'underlying governmental policy'
that could be implemented without regulating speech. In this way, these commercial
speech bans not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues
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ernment's asserted goals at face value or assumed they were a substantial
government interest in the past, but the Court is more closely evaluating
the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations today.256 It may
(and should) look more closely at the reasons for regulating trademarks
and not simply defer to the judgment of the legislature that our constitu-
tional freedoms are sufficiently protected. Prevention of free riding and
other proposed goals of trademark law may not satisfy constitutional
scrutiny.
A broad trademark goal, such as protecting consumers from harm, is
more likely to be found substantial or compelling, but this particular
trademark law must be sufficiently narrowly tailored to prevent the sup-
pression or chill of protected expression. If the goals of trademark law
are defined more narrowly, such as preventing confusion about sponsor-
ship or approval of use of a mark in artistic or literary works, some may
question whether the alleged harm to consumers is real and sufficiently
material to justify restricting this expression.
Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, I believe there is usually no substantial (let alone compelling) govern-
ment interest in preventing confusion regarding the markholder's
sponsorship or approval of use of its mark in artistic or literary works and
other commentary, parody, or satire where there is no confusion regard-
ing source.257 Confusion about whether trademark law requires consent
to use another's mark in a magazine or whether the markholder con-
sented to this design displayed on a T-shirt2 58 should not be equated with
confusion caused by the misleading use of a mark that dupes consumers
seeking the plaintiff's product into buying the defendant's product. If
there is no evidence consumers actually relied, or are likely to rely, on
of public policy." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-03 (1996) (plural-
ity opinion) (citations and footnotes omitted).
256. See supra Part I.A.
257. I include satire here even though some courts "elevate parody as a favored form of
literary or artistic comment and devalue satire" in intellectual property cases, both because
the difference between parody and satire is unclear and because excluding satire does not
take into account the "First Amendment values served by satires as well as parodies."
Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: Parody
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 979, 999-1009 (2004). Satire is entitled to
First Amendment protection just like parody. See E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1042 n.142 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (declining to decide
whether use in a video game of a strip club's "Play Pen" mark was a parody of the strip
club or part of a larger parody of Los Angeles because "parody is not the exclusive form of
expression protected under the First Amendment"); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Na-
ture Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Even if not technically a parody,
Nature Labs' use [of "Timmy Holedigger" for pet perfumes] is at least a pun or comical
expression-ideas also held to be entitled to First Amendment protection.").
258. E.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that fifty-eight percent of consumers surveyed thought the defendant "needed
Anheuser-Busch's approval" to publish the parody and six percent believed the ad was a
product of Anheuser-Busch; some said the markholder must have consented or "they'd
never get away with it"); Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 400 (noting that twelve percent of the
sample population said yes to the question "[w]ould you say that Mutual of Omaha goes




this third party use of the mark to their detriment or were otherwise
harmed by this expression, trademark holders must identify another con-
stitutionally sufficient reason for restricting expression that incorporates
their marks. Preventing trademark free riding or a markholder's loss of
control over the mark or its brand image does not qualify; there is no
substantial government interest in protecting "the unfettered right [of
markholders] to suppress the use of [their marks] in any context, com-
mercial or noncommercial, found to be offensive, negative, or unwhole-
some. ' '259 To conclude otherwise would give trademark holders too much
control over language.
These goals of trademark law should be evaluated using intermediate
scrutiny analysis when they regulate nonmisleading commercial uses of
marks and strict constitutional scrutiny when they regulate noncommer-
cial speech, as explained in more detail below.
1. Intermediate Scrutiny for Commercial Speech Regulations
Regulations of nonmisleading commercial speech are currently subject
to Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny test: Assuming the speech is
not misleading and concerns a lawful activity, the trademark regulation
violates the First Amendment unless the government interest in regulat-
ing the expression is substantial, the regulation directly advances that
government interest, and the speech regulation is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.2 60 The regulation need not be the
least restrictive means to achieve the government's goal.261
The government has the burden to prove the Central Hudson test is
satisfied. 262 Among other things, the government must "demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real.' '263 In private trademark litigation, this
burden is on the trademark holder, as it is asking the court to punish or
enjoin the defendant's use of the mark.264 The Central Hudson test is not
toothless; the Court has recently struck down several laws under this
test.265 Moreover, the Court has said the government "retains less regu-
259. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987); see also
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating "although economic
damage might be an intended effect of [defendant's use of the domain name taubman-
sucks.com], the First Amendment protects critical commentary when there is no confusion
as to source, even when it involves the criticism of a business"); Cantwell, supra note 22, at
69-71 (noting that the defendant may claim that it is ridiculing the markholder "because
trademarks have come to assume a significance that is out of all proportion to their societal
function as commercial identifiers, and that there is some public benefit to be derived from
deflating these pretensions").
260. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
261. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989).
262. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-71 (1993).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 770 ("It is well established that '[tihe party seeking to uphold a restriction on
commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.' ") (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
265. See supra note 74.
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latory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at the sub-
stance of the information communicated," 266 which is the case for
trademark laws.267
Scholars contend that some trademark laws regulating commercial
speech do not survive Central Hudson scrutiny, such as trademark protec-
tion for descriptive terms,268 the current trademark dilution laws,269 and
the doctrine of initial interest confusion, which is applied to the use of
trademarks to trigger keyword advertising, among other uses of marks.
270
Moreover, Professor Rebecca Tushnet has argued that the constitutional-
ity of "the core of the Lanham Act-its prohibition of commercial uses of
words and symbols that are confusingly similar to words and symbols
used by other commercial entities"-cannot even be taken for granted if
trademark infringement laws are subject to real First Amendment analy-
sis. 271 Rather than summarize this constitutional analysis here, for the
sake of brevity readers are encouraged to consult the above-cited scholar-
ship. These scholars raise serious questions about the constitutionality of
some current trademark statutes and common law doctrines.
Due to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, courts may be hesitant
to engage in constitutional analysis of these trademark laws. The court
must do so, however, if a defendant directly challenges the constitutional-
ity of a trademark law and the court is unable to rule for the defendant on
other grounds. For example, if the defendant argues on a motion to dis-
266. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (citations and inter-
nal quotations omitted); see also id. at 502 ("Regulations that suppress the truth are no less
troubling because they target objectively verifiable information, nor are they less effective
because they aim at durable messages. As a result, neither the 'greater objectivity' nor the
'greater hardiness' of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech justifies reviewing its
complete suppression with added deference.").
267. See infra Part II.D.2.c.
268. Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1146-74.
269. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commer-
cial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW & THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 294, 312-22 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Mary La-
France, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial
Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 711 (2007); Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision
Act-A Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189, 1193
(2006); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cogni-
tive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008). Commentators have also discussed the constitu-
tionality of federal and state dilution laws before Congress enacted the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006. See, e.g., Richard B. Biagi, The Intersection of First Amend-
ment Commercial Speech Analysis and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: A Jurispruden-
tial Roadmap, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 867, 875-889 (2001); Denicola, supra note 5, at 194-95;
Megan E. Gray, Defending Against a Dilution Claim: A Practitioner's Guide, 4 TEX. IN-
TELL. PROP. L.J. 205, 225-27 (1996); Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay
Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 147-48 (1989); Malla Pollack, Time to Dilute the Dilu-
tion Statute and What Not to Do When Opposing Legislation, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OF. Soc'Y 518, 540-41 (1996); Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark
Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 433, 446-47
(1994); Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for 'Famous' Trademarks:
Anti-Competitive 'Monopoly' or Earned 'Property' Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653, 739-40
(1995); Volokh, supra note 34, at 732-39.
270. Rothman, supra note 9, at 150-59.
271. Tushnet, supra note 211, at 739, 748-556.
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miss that the federal and state dilution laws are unconstitutional restric-
tions of nonmisleading commercial speech under the First Amendment,
the court cannot ignore this constitutional argument unless it rules for the
defendant on other grounds. If the commercial speech is not misleading
and concerns lawful activity, the court must apply each of the Central
Hudson factors and articulate why this law is constitutional before it can
deny the motion to dismiss. Engaging in this analysis will consume some
judicial and litigant resources, but it can also protect expression in indi-
vidual cases and generally raise awareness of the potential or actual con-
flict between certain trademark laws and free expression. Moreover, this
constitutional analysis-however complicated or time-consuming-is re-
quired by the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence when trademark
law regulates nonmisleading commercial speech because trademarks are
not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.
2. Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Trademark Laws
If the government is regulating noncommercial speech in trademark
law, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence dictates that the consti-
tutionality of that trademark regulation will usually depend on whether it
is content-based or content-neutral. This classification may also be im-
portant for evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech regula-
tions if the Court abandons Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny
test.272 As explained below, trademark laws are content-based speech
regulations subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny when they are not
restricting commercial speech.
a. The Level of Constitutional Scrutiny
Unless a categorical exception to full First Amendment protection ap-
plies, content-based regulations of speech are generally evaluated using
strict scrutiny analysis, while content-neutral regulations are subjected to
intermediate constitutional scrutiny. 273 A content-based speech regula-
tion survives strict scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored and is the least restric-
tive means to promote a compelling government interest. 274 Even if
alternative avenues of communication exist for the speaker to convey its
message, "time, place, and manner" intermediate scrutiny analysis is in-
appropriate if a speech regulation is content-based.2 7 5 The Court has said
content-based restrictions of speech are presumptively invalid.2 76 When
the Court applies strict scrutiny analysis, the regulations are usually held
to be unconstitutional. Strict scrutiny analysis is almost always "fatal in
272. Of course, if the Court abandons the Central Hudson test for commercial speech
regulations generally, it could still retain an intermediate scrutiny test for evaluating the
constitutionality of trademark laws. See supra Part II.D.2.d.
273. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
274. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
275. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997).
276. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817.
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fact. ' 277 That does not mean, however, that all content-based regulations
are unconstitutional.
As discussed in Part II.C., many content-based speech regulations, such
as antitrust, securities, labor, and evidence laws, are never subjected to
any constitutional analysis. Moreover, other content-based regulations of
speech are found constitutional because the subject matter of the speech
falls within a categorical exception to First Amendment protection, such
as obscenity. Although such regulations of speech discriminate based on
content, the Court has said "strict scrutiny is unwarranted" because the
risk that "the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or view-
points from the marketplace" is "inconsequential. '278 If they were sub-
jected to constitutional scrutiny, it is possible courts would find that these
speech regulations satisfy the highest burden of justification imposed by
the First Amendment. 279 Content-based laws are therefore subject to
strict constitutional scrutiny unless the Court decides-for whatever rea-
son-that heightened scrutiny is unwarranted for this particular restric-
tion of speech.
Less constitutional scrutiny is required for content-neutral regulations
of speech. They "are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 280
Under the United States v. O'Brien test for regulations of expressive con-
duct, the government may regulate conduct with speech components if
the restriction furthers an important or substantial government interest,
that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the
speech restriction is no greater than is essential to further that interest.2
81
Laws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech are constitutional
under the Ward v. Rock Against Racism test if they are justified without
reference to the speech's content, are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information. 282 The O'Brien and Ward tests are
similar in analysis to the intermediate scrutiny test in Central Hudson and
much less rigorous than strict scrutiny analysis. 283
277. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1313 (2007)
(citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972)).
278. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007).
279. Schauer, supra note 174, at 1765-68.
280. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
281. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
282. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The "narrowly tailored"
element here does not require the least restrictive means to further the government's goal,
but only requires that the chosen restriction is not "substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the government's interest." Id. at 798, 800.
283. See Bhagwat, supra note 55, at 801; S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic




b. The Distinction Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral
Regulations of Speech
According to Professor Mark Tushnet, "the central organizing concept
of First Amendment doctrine is the distinction between content-based
regulations and content-neutral ones. ' 284 Classification of a trademark
regulation as content-based or content-neutral may be critical to that
law's constitutionality, but the Court's content-based/content-neutral
doctrine is unclear, complicated, and inconsistent. 285 As there is no indi-
cation the Court will abandon this doctrine, below I briefly summarize
the Court's principles for evaluating the content-neutrality of speech reg-
ulations and then, in the next section, explain in detail why trademark
laws are content-based speech regulations.
In 1972, the Supreme Court said "[a]bove all else, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content."2 86 While this
statement is not entirely true under the Court's current First Amendment
jurisprudence-Congress may, for example, ban obscene speech because
of its subject matter-the point is clear. Government regulation of
speech based on its message, ideas, subject matter, or content is disfa-
vored under the First Amendment.
More than twenty years later in Turner, the Court explained in detail
why content-based regulations of expression may harm free speech
values:
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each per-
son should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserv-
ing of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political
system and cultural life rest upon this ideal .... Government action
that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the ut-
terance of a particular message favored by the Government, contra-
venes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk
that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate
the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. These
restrictions 'rais[e] the specter that the Government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.' ... For these
reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-un-
derstood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control
over the content of messages expressed by private individuals ....
[The Court's] precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential bur-
284. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Its First Amendment Constituency, 44 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 881, 882 (1993).
285. See generally, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimina-
tion, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 636 (1991).
286. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
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dens upon speech because of its content .... In contrast, regulations
that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an interme-
diate level of scrutiny, ...because in most cases they pose a less
substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the pub-
lic dialogue.287
The Court admits that "[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is
content based or content neutral is not always a simple task. '2 88 In Tur-
ner, and more recently in Bartnicki, the Court discussed the relevant in-
quiry: "In determining whether a regulation is content based or content
neutral, the Court looks to the purpose behind the regulation; typically,
government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as
it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. '289
"As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are
content based. '290 "By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose bur-
dens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in
most instances content neutral. ''291
Although the Court stated in Ward that the government purpose or
justification behind a law is the "principal inquiry" and the "controlling
consideration" in determining content-neutrality,2 92 this is not the only
inquiry.293 Sometimes it may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
the government's true purpose in regulating this speech because motiva-
tion is easily concealed.294 A stated purpose in the text of a statute, or
statements in the legislative history, may not be the actual purpose of
every member, or even a majority, of the legislature. In Turner, the
Court emphasized that a content-based purpose "is not necessary" to
show that a regulation is based on the content of speech; a regulation may
be content-based even if the legislator's asserted purpose is content-neu-
tral.295 "[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose" is not
"enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on con-
tent. '2 96 In some circumstances, the statute's operational text may pro-
vide the best evidence of the government's content-based purpose in
enacting this legislation. 297
287. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) (internal citations
omitted).
288. Id. at 642.
289. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (internal quotations and brackets
omitted).
290. Turner, 512 U.S. at 643.
291. Id.
292. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
293. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("Selective exclu-
sions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.") (emphasis added).
294. See Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETER-
NALLY VIGILANT, supra note 185, at 128.
295. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642-43 (quoted in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 n.9).
296. Id.




Applying the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence summarized
above, a speech regulation is content-based if (1) the government's pur-
pose behind the law is content-based or (2) the law discriminates on its
face based on the speech's content. Trademark laws are content-based
speech regulations for both of these reasons.
c. Trademark Laws Are Content-Based Regulations of Speech
The few courts and scholars that have discussed the content-neutrality
of government regulations of trademarks disagree on whether they are
content-based or content-neutral. Courts generally engage in a cursory
analysis of the issue, if they address it at all. In one sentence, the Second
Circuit summarily concluded that the federal trademark statute is a con-
tent-neutral speech regulation in Dallas Cowboys: "The prohibition of the
Lanham Act is content neutral . . . and therefore does not arouse the
fears that trigger the application of constitutional 'prior restraint' princi-
ples."'2 98 This conclusion was cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in
Dr. Seuss.299 Both decisions are criticized by Professors Volokh and
Lemley as confusing viewpoint-neutrality with content-neutrality. 300
Later, in Nissan, the Ninth Circuit held that an injunction prohibiting use
of the Nissan mark to make disparaging remarks or negative commentary
about Nissan "is a content-based restriction because the purpose behind
it is to control the message and [the restriction] is not 'justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech."' 301 The Eighth Circuit
admits there may be merit to the argument that courts "restrict the con-
tent of speech" when they "forbid the use of trademarks as the grist for
parody," but thought this argument did not apply to an injunction prohib-
iting use of a particular design on T-shirts and other novelty
merchandise.302
The U.S. Supreme Court has not expressed its opinion on the content-
neutrality of the Lanham Act or state trademark laws. The Court did,
however, implicitly suggest that a law similar to trademark law was a con-
tent-neutral regulation in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee.30 3 In this case, a 7-2 majority of the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Amateur Sports Act, which prohibits
certain uses of the word "Olympic" and related symbols without authori-
298. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d
Cir. 1979).
299. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,1403 n.l (9th
Cir. 1997) (rejecting the defendants' "claim that the injunction in this case constitutes a
prior restraint in violation of free speech guaranteed by the United States Constitution").
See generally Tyler Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice, and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a
Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 546 (1998).
300. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 218.
301. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004).
302. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1987).
303. 483 U.S. 522, 561, 570 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
analysis was not proper because the speech restriction was content-based); see Mark S.
Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech
Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 484 (2003).
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zation by the United States Olympic Committee. The Court held that the
ban on particular uses of the word "Olympic" by the sponsors of the
"Gay Olympic Games" in noncommercial speech satisfied constitutional
scrutiny under O'Brien, the intermediate-scrutiny test for evaluating con-
tent-neutral regulations of expressive conduct. 30 4  According to the
Court, this speech restriction should not be evaluated using heightened
constitutional scrutiny because the Act did not restrict the content of the
message conveyed, but only the "manner" in which the sponsors could
identify and promote their games.30 5 The analysis and conclusion in this
decision have been applied by lower courts in trademark disputes306 and
aptly criticized by commentators and Justice Brennan.307
Only a few scholars have engaged in serious analysis of the content-
neutrality of trademark law. In the best and most thorough discussion of
the issue, Professors Lemley and Volokh, and later Professor Volokh
alone in his Houston Law Review article, argue that trademark laws are
content-based regulations of speech. 308 In the copyright law area, schol-
ars strongly disagree on whether copyright law is content-based 309 or con-
tent-neutral.310 The Court did not explicitly resolve this issue in Eldred,
304. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535-36, 541(1987). It also found the commercial speech restrictions satisfied Central Hudson scrutiny.
Id. at 535-36.
305. Id. at 568.
306. E.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1171-
73 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
307. E.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 570(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Denicola, supra note 5, at 206; Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at
411-12; Kravitz, supra note 269, at 146, 166-77; Volokh, supra note 34, at 712, 736-37.
308. Volokh, supra note 34, at 712; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 219-20. Some
scholars mention briefly that trademark regulations are generally content-based, e.g.,
Schauer, supra note 174, at 1783 (noting that "much the same degree of First Amendment
irrelevance holds true for the content-based regulation of trademarks") (citing Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979)), or content-neutral speech regulations, e.g., Paul Bender,
The Constitutionality of Proposed Federal Database Protection, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 143,
153-54 (2002) (stating that "the protection that has been given by statute and common law
to trademarks" is a "content neutral misappropriation restriction[] that can be seen as
being narrowly tailored to serve substantial governmental interests"), but do not provide
an explanation for their conclusions. Some commentators have discussed whether specific
trademark provisions, such as the ban on registration of "immoral, deceptive, or scandal-
ous matter," 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000), are content-based or content-neutral speech re-
strictions, see e.g., Llewellyn J. Gibbons, Trademarking the Immoral and Scandalous:
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, in 3 INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 147 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) ("Sec-
tion 2(a) is not a content-neutral regulation of speech."); Jeffrey Leftsin, Note, Does the
First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Redskins?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 706 (2000).
309. E.g., Volokh, supra note 34, at 702-10; C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits
on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 939-40 (2002); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at
169, 186; Brett McDonnell and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judg-
ment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2447 (1998); cf Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 49 (2002) (noting
that copyright law is generally content-based, except copyright rules regulating verbatim
copying are content-neutral).
310. E.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of
Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 535, 555-56, 588 (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protec-
tions and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36
[Vol. 61
First Amendment Scrutiny
although it did reject the "plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scru-
tiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective
purposes and safeguards."
'311
I agree with Professors Lemley and Volokh that trademark laws are
generally content-based speech regulations. Trademark laws define the
speech they prohibit or allow based on the content of the speech.3 12 As
noted by the Court, a law is content-based if it "is the content of the
speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute's blunt
prohibition. ' 313 Below, this Article adds to the scholarship on this topic
by providing a more detailed application of the Court's content-based/
content-neutral jurisprudence to trademark law and additional arguments
demonstrating why trademark laws are content-based speech regulations.
It proposes and develops the concept of "word choice discrimination" in
trademark law, discusses the various ways trademark law discriminates
based on subject matter, and explains why trademark laws are generally
viewpoint neutral. Trademark laws that discriminate based on word
choice and subject matter may ultimately be constitutional, but they are
still content-based regulations of speech.
i. Word Choice Discrimination
To evaluate whether a violation of trademark law has occurred, the
trier of fact must examine the content of the defendant's expression to
determine if the defendant is using a word, name, symbol, or device
(hereinafter "word" for brevity) that is identical or similar to the plain-
tiff's protected trademark in a manner that is likely to cause consumer
confusion, dilution, or some other trademark violation. This examination
of the defendant's speech is a two-part inquiry that focuses on the word
choice of the defendant and the subject matter of the message conveyed.
The trier of fact must first consult the content of the defendant's speech
to determine whether the defendant is even using a word that is identical
or similar in some way to the plaintiff's trademark. In most trademark
cases this criteria will be satisfied. Without some use by the defendant of
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 83, 93-94 (2002); David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot
Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. Prrr. L. REV. 281, 294-96 (2004); cf. Rebecca Thshnet,
Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Cam-
paign Finance Reform, Hate Speech and Pornography Regulation, and Telecommunications
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (2001) (noting that copyright law "seems content- and
viewpoint-neutral on its face"). Professor Netanel believes that copyright laws are content-
neutral speech regulations and that courts should apply Turner's heightened form of
O'Brien/Ward intermediate scrutiny analysis because the government is allocating speech
entitlements. Neil Weinstocks Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2001) (citing Turner Broadcast System v. F.C.C., 512 U.S.
622 (1994)); NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 120 & n.31 (2007). In Eldred, the
petitioners principally relied on Turner to support their First Amendment argument, but
the Court concluded that Turner "bears little on copyright." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 220-21 (2003); see generally NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX, supra, at 172-94 (dis-
cussing Eldred and arguing for "First Amendment intervention in copyright law").
311. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19.
312. Volokh, supra note 34, at 703; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 218-20.
313. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980).
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a word that evokes the plaintiff's mark, there is no legitimate reason for
the plaintiff to file suit or for the judge or jury to find a trademark viola-
tion. If the defendant is using a completely different word as a mark,
then the defendant is not liable for a trademark violation in a suit by this
plaintiff because it has not used the plaintiff's trademark. By allowing the
use of some words but not others, trademark law discriminates based on
word choice. I call this type of content discrimination "word choice dis-
crimination. ' 314 Trademark liability depends on the content of the defen-
dant's speech because the defendant is not liable unless the exact words it
uses are identical or sufficiently similar to the plaintiff's trademark. 315
Government prohibitions on the use of certain words can have a signif-
icant effect on the communicative impact of expression. Some words may
be more effective than others in conveying the speaker's intended mes-
sage. 316 Most people would agree that Paul Cohen's message 3 17 would
not be as strong if his jacket displayed the statement "I Strongly Resent
the Draft" or "Ban the Draft" rather than the more emotive statement
"Fuck the Draft. ' 318 An anti-war message is more powerful when the
peace sign is superimposed on the American flag rather than white poster
board. 319 Although the Court disagreed,320 the San Francisco Athletics
Association believed the term "Gay Olympic Games" communicated its
message about the treatment of gays in society better than the phrase
"Gay Games. ' 321 When punishment or liability depends on what word or
symbol is used by the speaker (a profane word, the American flag, the
Olympic word and symbols or another's trademark), that speech regula-
tion is content-based regardless of whether the law is constitutionally jus-
tified. There is always a chance that word choice matters in the
communication of a particular idea. As noted by the Court in Cohen,
314. Although I use the phrase "word choice discrimination," I intend for the term to
also apply to trademarked names, symbols, and devices.
315. For this reason, trademark law is different than the Colorado statute in Hill, where
the content of the speech was examined but the Court said that "it is unlikely that there
would often be any need to know exactly what words were spoken in order to determine
whether 'sidewalk counselors' are engaging in 'oral protest, education, or counseling'
rather than pure social or random conversation." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720
(2000).
316. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 2002)("[A]lthough English is a language rich in imagery, we need not belabor the point that
some words, phrases or symbols better convey their intended meanings than others.");
Volokh, supra note 34, at 712.
317. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (noting that Cohen was in the Los
Angeles County Courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
and testified that this message was intended to inform the public of the depth of his feel-
ings against the Vietnam war and the draft).
318. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 569 (1987)(Brennan, J., dissenting); Frank Haiman, Speech and Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be
Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153, 189 (1972); Volokh, supra note 34, at 703.
319. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974).
320. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987).
321. Id. at 525, 535 n.13; see also Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:




"[w]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process." 322
Trademark law regulates word choice in different ways. A domain
name can express ideas and information, so using trademark law to ban
the use of language claimed as a mark in that domain name is a content-
based regulation that may make the domain name less effective. 323 A
prohibition on the unauthorized use of trademarks on the front of T-
shirts or in the titles or content of artistic or literary works changes the
content of the words or symbols used in that message 324 "Mutant of
Omaha" with the distorted logo of Mutual of Omaha conveys the mes-
sage in a different and more attention-grabbing way than the phrase "Nu-
clear War Causes Mutations" displayed on T-shirts. When applied to
commentary, parody, or satire, trademark law deprives artists, authors,
activists, and humorists the ability to use particular words. Prohibiting
the use of trademarked descriptive terms in part of a brand name, slogan,
or domain name or the use of trademarks to trigger keyword advertising
may stifle the efficient communication of commercial information to con-
sumers about competing products. Granting strong trademark rights
across several industries in common words that are inherently catchy or
interesting, such as "Virgin, '3 25 reduces the amount of language with nat-
ural selling power that is available for use as a mark by new entrants to
the marketplace.
By restricting the use of particular words, trademark laws are simply
not analogous to other speech restrictions found to be content-neutral.
Trademark laws are different from government restrictions on sound am-
plification devices on trucks, 326 prohibitions of speech near schools that
are disruptive of the schools, 327 regulations restricting speech on public
sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building,328 laws regulating the
322. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
323. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp.
2d 915, 919 (E.D. Va. 2000) (peta.org), affd on other grounds, 263 F. 3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001);
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F, Supp. 2d 176, 184, 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (buf-
falonews.com); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J.), aff'd 159 F.3d
1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (jewsforjesus.org).
324. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th
Cir. 1997); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New
Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
325. Virgin Enters. v. So Collective, No. 04-08964 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2004); see Paul
Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act-A Consumer Perspective, 16 FORIHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 1189, 1201-02 (2006) (discussing the dilution claims filed
by Virgin Enterprises against several small companies that use the term "Virgin" in their
brand names); see also Amanda Cantrell, Branson trademark suit sparks debate: 'Rebel
billionaire' sues small companies using word 'Virgin'-and often wins. But is it right?,
CNNMONEY (June 29, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/29/newslnewsmakerslbran-
sonsuit/index.htm.
326. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
327. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
328. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
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noise level at concerts, 329 a sales tax which applies to all purchases, in-
cluding cable television, 330 or state fair regulations regarding the distribu-
tion of materials.331 The restrictions on word choice in trademark law are
one reason trademark law is a content-based speech restriction. As the
government does not disapprove of the word itself, such restrictions are
more like content-based flag desecration laws3 32 rather than profanity
laws, but they are still content-based.
A few courts explicitly or implicitly conclude that trademark laws are
content-neutral regulations of speech because the government is not
prohibiting, and does not intend to prohibit, the speaker's ultimate mes-
sage in any form. Under this view, use of the trademarked word is
banned in this context, but alternative words may be used to communi-
cate the same message. These courts say the trademark regulation is con-
stitutional because adequate "alternative avenues of communication"-
i.e. other words-exist for the defendant to convey its message. 333 In
Friedman, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, and Pacifica, the Court has
similarly suggested that government prohibitions on word choice only
have an incidental effect on the content of the message, 334 and primarily
affect the "manner" or "form" of speech rather than its message. 335
329. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
330. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
331. Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
332. E.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-17 (1990) ("Although the Flag
Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited
conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is related to the
suppression of free expression,... and concerned with the content of such expression.")
(citations and internal quotations omitted); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8
(1974) (noting that the purpose of the flag desecration law "is directly related to expression
in the context of activity like that undertaken by" the defendant and thus the O'Brien test
was inapplicable).
333. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d
Cir. 1979); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR, 2008 WL 755069, at *31 (D. Kan. Mar.
19, 2008) ("While defendants have a right to express whatever views they purport to be
expressing in printing these T-shirts, KU's marks 'need not yield to the exercise of First
Amendment rights under these circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of com-
munication exist."'); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727,
734-35 (D. Minn. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp.
1559, 1571-77 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Reddy Commc'ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199
U.S.P.Q. 630, 634 (D.D.C. 1977). The Second Circuit later rejected this standard in "the
context of titles" in Rogers and said it did "not read Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as gener-
ally precluding all consideration of First Amendment concerns whenever an allegedly in-
fringing author has 'alternative avenues of communication."' Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994, 999 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1989)
334. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (stating "that the restriction on the
use of trade names has only the most incidental effect on the content of the commercial
speech of Texas optometrists").
335. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 536 (holding that the statute banning unautho-
rized use of the word Olympic and related symbols did not prevent the defendant "from
conveying its message," as it held the same event under a different name (the Gay Games
I), and thus the law "restricts only the manner in which the SFAA may convey its mes-
sage"); Fed. Commcn's Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 & n.18 (1978) (hold-
ing that an afternoon radio broadcast of comedian George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words"
monologue violated a restriction against broadcasting indecent language at certain times
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The problem with this analysis is that these speech restrictions regulat-
ing word choice are "aimed precisely at the content of speech, and not at
some problem, such as noise or litter-problems afflicting property, not
words--that occur as a byproduct of speech. '336 For the restriction to be
content neutral, the term "manner" in "time, place, or manner" must be
interpreted to mean the way in which speech is communicated-such as
the decibel level of the speech-not the language used to convey the mes-
sage. When trademark laws prohibit use of a word claimed as a trade-
mark in brand names, slogans, domain names, artistic and literary works,
and on T-shirts, there are no "alternative avenues" for using the exact
same words in these particular ways. 337 Because the choice of words can
be critical to the message-some firms spend large sums of money to se-
lect the perfect brand name-any restriction on use of a trademark may
have a significant effect on the content of speech. The primary-not inci-
dental-effect of trademark law is to ban certain uses of trademarked
words by speakers other than the trademark holder because of the direct
impact of the speech's content on the public.
ii. Subject Matter Discrimination
When the government bans the use of trademarked words to convey
certain information or ideas, these speech restrictions are also content-
based because they discriminate based on the subject matter of speech.
Laws regulating certain subjects or categories of speech that are unpro-
tected or less protected by the First Amendment are, by definition, con-
tent-based speech regulations. 338 Trademark laws discriminate based on
subject matter, and thus content, when they target uses of trademarks
that are misleading, diluting, or commercial. Trademark law's content-
based exceptions to trademark liability also make it content-based.
339
a. Misleading Uses of Trademarks
Section 45 of the Lanham Act contains evidence of an intent by Con-
gress to regulate misleading uses of trademarks: "The intent of this chap-
ter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making
actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce ...
[and] to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks. '340 Whether "use of marks" is "deceptive and misleading" or
and stating that "[a] requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication").
336. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 22, at 412.
337. See Denicola, supra note 5, at 206; Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 22,
at 411-12; Kravitz, supra note 269, at 146, 166-77; Volokh, supra note 34, at 711-12.
338. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 67, at 933; see also Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate
Role in Government Funding of the Arts?. 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1217 (1993).
339. Volokh, supra note 34, at 703; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 218-20.
340. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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causes "fraud and deception" depends on the speech's content. Moreo-
ver, certain federal trademark provisions discriminate on their face
against misleading speech. The federal trademark infringement statutes
ban use of a trademark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive. ' '34 1 If a domain name is "identical or confusingly
similar to" a distinctive mark, registration or use of that domain name
may create liability under the cybersquatting statute if the other elements
of the ACPA are satisfied. 342 The statement of statutory intent in Section
45, along with operational provisions of the federal trademark statute,
provides strong proof that Congress regulates trademarks in part because
it disapproves of misleading messages conveyed by certain unauthorized
uses of a trademark.
This goal of preventing misleading speech is worthy, and most federal
and state laws enacted by legislatures to achieve this goal are probably
constitutional if they regulate misleading commercial speech, but such
laws are still content-based speech regulations. Just like defamation laws
which ban false and defamatory statements about people, any prohibition
on the misleading use of a trademark is content-based. 343
b. Diluting Uses of Trademarks
The federal dilution statute covers use of a famous trademark in a man-
ner "that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment
of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury. ' 344 It is
clear from the text of this statute that Congress disapproves of the harm
caused by trademark uses that are likely to cause dilution. Dilution by
blurring "is association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark. '345 Dilution by tarnishment "is association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark. ' 346 Moreover, if the defendant
has registered or is using a domain name that is "dilutive of" another's
famous mark, it might also be liable under the ACPA. 34 7
In all of these circumstances, the government perceives the harm to be
coming from the association conveyed by a diluting use of the mark.
Moreover, the fact-finder must examine the content of the defendant's
speech to determine if the defendant's use of the word in this context
causes one of these forms of dilution. This is another reason trademark
dilution laws are content-based speech regulations.
341. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
342. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
343. Volokh, supra note 34, at 703.
344. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
345. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
346. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006).
347. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
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c. Commercial Uses of Trademarks
The government generally intends to burden commercial speech more
than noncommercial speech in trademark law. While there is no explicit
statement by Congress in Section 45 of the Lanham Act of an intent to
restrict commercial uses of trademarks, the operational text of certain
statutory provisions indicates the government prefers to primarily regu-
late commercial speech. As discussed earlier in Part I.B, the text of the
federal trademark dilution statute explicitly states that the law only ap-
plies to commercial speech; it exempts noncommercial uses of trade-
marks from dilution liability.348 The commercial nature of the trademark
use may also be relevant in actions for violations of trademark infringe-
ment law and the ACPA.349 Some courts have even said that "[t]he Lan-
ham Act is constitutional because it only regulates commercial
speech." 350
Applying the Court's analysis in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, dilution law is content-based because whether any particular trade-
mark use falls within its coverage (or an exception to the law) is
determined by the content of the speech in which that trademark is
used.351 If application of a trademark law depends on the commercial
nature of the speech, the ban is content-based by any "commonsense un-
derstanding of the term. '352 There is a content-based purpose if the gov-
ernment exempts noncommercial speech from application of the law
because it believes this speech is valuable. 353 If the government intends
to burden commercial speech because it has less value, this is not a neu-
tral justification for selectively regulating commercial uses of trademarks.
That justification makes the law content-based. 354 Targeting commercial
speech in trademark law is speech protective, and may ultimately be con-
stitutional under Central Hudson, but this subject matter discrimination
348. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006).
349. See supra Part I.B.2.
350. Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2003).
351. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429-30 (1993) (holding
that the city's news rack policy was content-based because "whether any particular news
rack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that
news rack"'); see also Volokh, supra note 34, at 706-09.
352. City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 430.
353. Id. at 429-30; see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1984) (exception
"for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes" in law ban-
ning photographic reproductions of currency); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 494-95, 515-16 (1981) (exception for "commemorative historical plaques," "signs
depicting time, temperature, and news," and "[t]emporary political campaign signs" in law
prohibiting billboards); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (exception for labor picketing
in Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing in residential neighborhoods); Volokh, supra
note 34, at 706-09. The legislative history of the FTDA indicates some members of Con-
gress were concerned a dilution law regulating "artistic and expressive" uses of a mark
would violate the First Amendment, and thus some legislators said the noncommercial use
exemption was included to address "legitimate First Amendment concerns." H.R. REP.
No. 104-374, at 4, 8 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S19306-10, S19310-12 (daily ed. Dec. 29,
1995); 141 CONG. REc. H14317-01, H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995).
354. City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 429-30.
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makes trademark law a content-based speech restriction. 355
d. Other Content-Based Exceptions to Trademark Liability
In addition to the exemption for noncommercial use of a trademark in
dilution law, the Lanham Act also contains other content-based excep-
tions to trademark liability that make trademark law content-based. The
federal dilution statute provides that "[a]ll forms of news reporting and
news commentary" are not "actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution
by tarnishment under this subsection. '356 Nor does the dilution statute
apply to "[a]ny fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other
than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services,
including use in connection with-(i) advertising or promotion that per-
mits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and paro-
dying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the
goods or services of the famous mark owner. '357 The legislative history
suggests Congress made this revision to address concerns that the dilution
statute did not sufficiently protect "traditional First Amendment uses,
such as parody and criticism. '358
Another speech-protective exception to trademark liability in the Lan-
ham Act is the "classic" fair use defense. This defense applies if the de-
fendant can prove its use of the plaintiff's mark "is a use, otherwise than
as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or ... of a
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe the goods or services of [the defendant], or their geo-
graphic origin. '359 This expression is allowed because it promotes com-
petition and the free flow of commercial information.
Like the noncommercial use exemption in dilution law, these built-in
First Amendment safeguards make trademark law content-based because
the provisions were enacted due to the value of the content of this expres-
sion. Whether use of a trademark qualifies for these exemptions or de-
fenses can only be determined by examining the content of the
defendant's speech.360 These exceptions are another reason that trade-
mark law is a content-based speech regulation.
All of the content-based distinctions in trademark law may seem be-
nign; there are compelling reasons for discriminating against misleading
commercial speech, allowing the diluting use of trademarks in noncom-
mercial speech, and permitting certain fair uses of trademarks. 361 Yet
these laws are still content-based (unlike regulations of the noise level at
355. Volokh, supra note 34, at 706-09.
356. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B) (2006).
357. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006).
358. 152 CONG. REc. H6963, H6965 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006); see also 152 CONG. REC.
S1921, S1923 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006).
359. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000); see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 11:49.
360. See Volokh, supra note 34, at 706-10.
361. See id. at 709-10.
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concerts), and this fact makes trademark law constitutionally suspect.
"The vice of content-based legislation-what renders it deserving of the
high standard of strict scrutiny-is not that it is always used for invidious,
thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those pur-
poses. '362 Trademark laws give judges and juries considerable discretion
when they evaluate the content of the defendant's speech and decide if
this use of a mark violates trademark law. The trier of fact does more
than just mechanically compare the trademarks used by the plaintiff and
defendant. It may-consciously or unconsciously-rule for the plaintiff
because the trademark is used by the defendant to convey a message that
is unwholesome (such as sex or drug-related expression) or unpopular. 363
As trademark laws discriminate based on subject matter, these content-
based speech restrictions should be subject to more constitutional scru-
tiny per the Court's First Amendment doctrine when they regulate non-
commercial speech.
iii. Viewpoint Discrimination
Restrictions on the use of trademarks are also content-based if they
discriminate based on viewpoint. Generally the government engages in
viewpoint discrimination if it regulates speech based on the views taken
by speakers on a subject. 364 Examples include laws banning statements
against the war or advocating communism, as well as laws allowing com-
mendation but not criticism of public officials. Viewpoint discrimination
"is considered virtually unconstitutional per se" in First Amendment
jurisprudence. 365
Scholars have said that trademark law is viewpoint-neutral. 366 Trade-
mark laws generally apply on their face to all firms and individuals re-
gardless of their identity and ideology. Anyone can be the "senior," or
first, user of a trademark and benefit from certain trademark rights in
that mark. Anyone can be the "junior," or later, user of another's trade-
mark that faces liability for violations of the trademark laws. The trade-
mark statutes do not target the use of another's trademarks to advocate
or oppose war, communism, abortion rights, immigration, gun control,
drug use, pornography, and other political or social issues, nor do the
statutes discriminate between trademark uses that disparage or celebrate
the trademark holder. Although trademark statutes do not discriminate
based on ideology on their face, courts may engage in such viewpoint
discrimination when they craft language in a trademark injunction.3 67
When they do, the injunction is content-based.
362. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 794 (1994).
363. Bartow, supra note 22, at 812; Volokh, supra note 34, at 710.
364. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).
365. Rubenfeld, supra note 309, at 6.
366. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 186, 218 & n.313; Volokh, supra note 34, at 703,
709-10.
367. E.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding the lower court's injunction prohibiting use of the Nissan trademark to
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Finally, trademark laws do discriminate between senior and junior
users of a trademark. Trademark law grants to the senior user of a mark
the exclusive right to use trademarked language "as a mark." It denies
this right to junior users of that trademark. For example, the holder of
the trademark registration for Park 'N Fly can use this descriptive term as
a mark for long-term parking lot services for airports, but the government
bans competitors from using identical or similar words in their own brand
names, such as Dollar Park & Fly.368 Trademark law thus provides a
competitive advantage to the senior markholder when potential new cus-
tomers consult phone books and other lists that only contain the brand
names of companies. Moreover, markholders often argue their exclusive
rights extend to slogans (such as "Gatorade is Thirst Aid"), domain
names (thechildrensplace.com), keyword advertising ("American Air-
lines"), and other uses of the descriptive term.369 Regardless of whether
the government is constitutionally justified in restricting speech in this
way, it is allowing the senior markholder (and its authorized licensees) to
use this trademarked word in certain ways, but not third parties. This
type of discrimination among speakers is troublesome from a free speech
perspective, 370 but it has not traditionally been characterized as "view-
point discrimination" under the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
d. Constitutional Analysis of Trademark Laws Regulating
Noncommercial Speech
As trademark laws regulating noncommercial speech are content-based
speech regulations, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence dictates
that they should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis. The resolution of
speech-harmful trademark disputes would be more predictable, and the
free speech principle of evaluative neutrality would be furthered, with a
categorical rule that content-based trademark laws are automatically un-
constitutional when subject to strict scrutiny analysis. As explained by
Professor Alexander, at its core, the meaning of freedom of expression
"requires regulators to abstain from acting on the basis of their own as-
sessments of a message's truth or value. ' '3 71 This principle is called "eval-
make disparaging remarks and negative comments about Nissan was a viewpoint-based,
and thus a content-based, regulation of speech).
368. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
369. See TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001);
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992); Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 4:2007CV00487 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2007).
370. United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 812 ("Laws designed or intended to sup-
press or restrict the expression of specific speakers contradict basic First Amendment prin-
ciples."). I thank Professor David McGowan for his helpful discussions with me on this
point, among others.
371. ALEXANDER, supra note 160, at 11. "For we could not credit a regime with honor-
ing freedom of expression if it announces that any ideas can be freely expressed so long as
the government believes the ideas to be true and valuable. In other words, anything recog-
nizable as a conception of freedom of expression must entail a requirement that govern-




uative neutrality. ' 372 The courts need not concern themselves with the
truth or value of noncommercial uses of trademarks if the Supreme Court
adopts a categorical rule that trademark laws always violate the right of
freedom of expression when they regulate noncommercial speech.3 73
Professor Volokh argues that a per se ban on content-based speech re-
strictions is generally preferable to means-ends constitutional scrutiny.3 74
Justice Kennedy also prefers a categorical framework; he said "that con-
tent-based speech restrictions that do not fall within any traditional ex-
ception [to First Amendment protection] should be invalidated without
inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling government interests. '375
Should all trademark laws regulating the use of marks in noncommercial
speech be found per se unconstitutional because a categorical exception
to full First Amendment protection does not apply?
For a number of reasons, the Court is unlikely to hold that strict scru-
tiny analysis is automatically fatal when applied to content-based trade-
mark laws or that trademark laws are categorically unconstitutional when
they regulate noncommercial speech (including misleading noncommer-
cial speech). As noted by the Court, "[n]ot all content-based regulations
are alike; ... some content-based restrictions raise more constitutional
questions than others. 376 Trademark laws, and the government purposes
behind them, are not as dangerous to free speech values as many other
content-based speech regulations. On their face, trademark statutes do
not ban the use of trademarks to criticize the U.S. or foreign governments
or government officers.377 Nor do they target the use of another firm's
trademarks to discuss, advocate, or oppose certain political or social is-
sues. While some judges or juries may find a trademark violation because
the defendant's expression has an unwholesome subject matter or a cer-
tain ideology, such cases are uncommon in trademark litigation.
There are other reasons that trademark laws are less constitutionally
suspect than other content-based regulations of speech. There is less risk
of government censorship in trademark law because Congress and state
legislatures generally do not list the words to be regulated in the trade-
mark statutes. Private parties can obtain rights in words used as trade-
marks based on use or registration of the mark, or by filing an intent-to-
use application for the trademark. 378 There is also less concern about
372. Id.
373. Cf. id. at 66, 176-81.
374. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring, and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PENN. L. REv. 2417, 2418 (1996).
375. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
376. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992).
377. Cf Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (holding that a restriction of speech
critical of foreign governments near their embassies was unconstitutional).
378. The government can also obtain trademark rights in words. The Department of
the Army has registered the mark "Be All You Can Be," among other trademarks, for




governmental misconduct in trademark cases because most trademark
suits are initiated by private parties, not the government. Trademark
holders decide whether to file suit and what causes of action and reme-
dies to pursue.
On the other hand, legislatures do say what types of words can become
protected trademarks. Moreover, they set forth what types of trademarks
can be registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and state
trademark registration offices. Registration alone likely deters certain
uses of the mark by third parties, as it provides certain benefits to the
trademark holder, such as a presumption of validity for marks on the fed-
eral principal trademark register.379 Courts also determine that certain
trademarks are protectable in trademark litigation. Moreover, in prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctions, courts list the plaintiff's trademarks and
order the defendant to refrain from using words identical or similar to
these trademarks in certain contexts. These content-based restrictions on
use of a trademark can still harm speech, but they are often less problem-
atic than other content-based laws because the words restricted are gen-
erally selected by private parties.
Another reason trademark laws are less insidious than other content-
based restrictions is that the government does not ban all public uses of a
trademarked word. Trademark laws usually allow certain nontrademark
or noncommercial uses of trademarked words by third parties. For this
reason, they are content-based time, place, or manner regulations.
380
Trademark laws raise First Amendment concerns because the govern-
ment disagrees with how the mark is used in the defendant's expression
and seeks to prevent the communicative impact of this word used in a
certain context. Yet trademark laws pose less risk of excising certain
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue compared to a complete re-
striction on use of a word by anyone in any context.
I believe some trademark laws could satisfy strict scrutiny even though
they regulate noncommercial speech. Many will not. A narrowly-tai-
lored trademark law regulating noncommercial speech could satisfy strict
scrutiny if it were the least restrictive means to further a compelling gov-
ernment interest. For example, trademark infringement laws banning the
misleading use in noncommercial speech of the distinctive marks of polit-
ical, religious, or other noncommercial groups could satisfy strict scrutiny
analysis if the marks were used by the defendant as marks to falsely des-
ignate the source of its activities. Protecting the ability of consumers to
identify and distinguish among the activities of noncommercial entities is
a compelling government interest. If these laws are narrowly tailored to
protect expression and the least restrictive means to further this interest,
they should be found constitutional.
379. Once a mark is registered, the fact of registration suggests that the trademark
holder is more likely to enforce its alleged trademark rights, as it has spent the time and
money to obtain a trademark registration.
380. Thanks to Paul Horton for his discussions with me on this point, among others.
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Yet serious questions regarding the constitutionality of other trade-
mark laws regulating noncommercial speech will be raised if the Court's
current First Amendment jurisprudence is faithfully applied. An example
would be trademark laws aimed at preventing consumer confusion re-
garding sponsorship or approval of the use of a mark in artistic or literary
works 381 and other commentary, parody, or satire, including use of an-
other's mark in domain names linked to noncommercial websites with
social commentary, 382 and noncommercial expression on T-shirts and
other novelty merchandise. 383 In cases involving the unauthorized use of
trademarks in the content or titles of artistic or literary expression, strict
scrutiny analysis will be more speech protective than the Rogers balanc-
ing test.3 84 Unlike strict scrutiny analysis, the Rogers test does not re-
quire proof that the purpose of this particular speech restriction is
compelling, nor does it require the speech restriction to be narrowly-tai-
lored and the least restrictive means to further this goal. Moreover, strict
scrutiny analysis does not limit constitutional protection only to uses of
trademarked language that have some artistic relevance to the underlying
work. Restrictions of marks allowed under the Rogers test 385 would be
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny analysis, especially in trademark
disputes involving satire where the defendant is not criticizing, comment-
ing on, or parodying the markholder.
For whatever reason, courts have generally not applied strict scrutiny
analysis to trademark laws regulating noncommercial speech. If judges
believe that trademark laws should be subject to less stringent constitu-
tional scrutiny, they should say so. They should not achieve the same
result by improperly characterizing content-based trademark laws as con-
tent-neutral speech regulations.386 Courts may be hesitant to hold that
some trademark laws survive strict scrutiny analysis because such a find-
ing could weaken First Amendment protection for speech generally. If
strict scrutiny of content-based speech regulations was no longer fatal in
fact, this result could devalue strict scrutiny analysis and make it easier
for the government to justify other regulations of core First Amendment
speech based on the content of the speech.387 Possibly for this reason, the
Supreme Court has applied lesser constitutional scrutiny to other con-
381. Trademark rights may be claimed in artistic or literary titles, and the markholder
may argue that another artist's or author's use of an identical or similar mark violates
trademark law. See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 10.1-40. Whether a law
prohibiting such a trademark use would satisfy strict scrutiny analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article.
382. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 787-90 (8th Cir. 2004).
383. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). The court thought
this speech was commercial, Id. at 402-03 & n.8 & 9, but I believe it is noncommercial. See
supra Part I.B.
384. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989).
385. See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D.
Minn. 1998).
386. E.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979).
387. Cf Stone, supra note 185, at 9.
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tent-based speech regulations where the risk that "the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" is "in-
consequential. '388 The Court may come to the same conclusion about
trademark law, and hold that the constitutionality of trademark laws
should be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny or some other lesser
constitutional standard-possibly a version of the Rogers balancing test-
in cases involving noncommercial uses of trademarks. Whether the Court
should do this is beyond the scope of this Article.
The Court may be tempted to follow the approach it used in Eldred.
As noted previously, the Court refused to impose "uncommonly strict
scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protec-
tive purposes and safeguards. ' 38 9 The Court held the Copyright Term
Extension Act need not be subject to further constitutional scrutiny be-
cause "Congress ha[d] not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection." 390 The problem with directly applying Eldred's analysis to
trademark law is that copyright and trademark laws have very different
goals and operational provisions. Trademark law does not have a speech-
protective purpose391 and trademark law's built-in First Amendment
safeguards are limited. 392 Could the "traditional contours" language pro-
vide some guidance? Traditional trademark law primarily regulated de-
ceptive uses of marks by competitors to divert trade. 393 If the
"traditional contours" of trademark law are constitutional, trademark in-
fringement laws prohibiting misleading uses of marks in commercial
speech would be consistent with the First Amendment, but much of cur-
rent trademark law would still be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
3. Other First Amendment Doctrines
When faced with a First Amendment challenge to a trademark law,
courts should also consider whether other First Amendment doctrines ap-
ply. A defendant may challenge a trademark injunction as an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint of speech, 394 although this argument has not fared
well in trademark cases. 395 At a minimum, courts should take First
Amendment values into account when determining the breadth of injunc-
tive relief; a narrowly-drafted injunction, or even requiring a disclaimer in
388. E.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007).
389. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003).
390. Id. at 221.
391. Although use of a mark by a markholder can be "speech," see supra Part II.B.,
encouraging the creation of new marks is not the goal of trademark law. See supra Part
II.D.
392. See generally Ramsey, supra note 11, at 149-63.
393. See supra note 2.
394. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 158-65; see Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 559 (1976). The Court has suggested in dicta that this rule may not apply to restric-
tions on commercial speech. See Freidman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
395. E.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 n.11
(9th Cir. 1997); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979).
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lieu of an injunction, may be necessary to protect expression.396 A defen-
dant may also argue that a particular trademark law is unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad and therefore chills speech.397 A full discussion of
these topics is beyond the scope of this Article.
In conclusion, trademark laws regulate, and are intended to regulate,
the use of particular words in certain messages by someone other than
the trademark holder. For this reason, trademark laws and injunctions
may conflict with the First Amendment in trademark disputes. If they do,
constitutional analysis is only one way the court can protect expression in
trademark law, as discussed next.
III. OPTIONS FOR INCREASING FIRST AMENDMENT
SCRUTINY OF TRADEMARK LAW
Legislatures may believe their trademark statutes are constitutional be-
cause they primarily regulate commercial speech or include certain de-
fenses and exemptions from liability. Courts must confirm these built-in
First Amendment safeguards are constitutionally sufficient.398 In every
trademark case, courts should seriously consider free speech interests
when interpreting the trademark statute. If a trademark provision harms
protected expression and the statute does not permit a speech-protective
construction, courts should apply constitutional analysis to the trademark
law using the framework in Part II. Free expression will be best pro-
tected in trademark law if legislatures and courts adopt more speech-pro-
tective trademark rules in trademark law. Among other benefits,
categorical safe harbors can increase predictability in trademark disputes
and enable judges to dispose of trademark claims that are harmful to free
speech early in the case.399 The different methods for preventing trade-
mark law from encroaching on protected expression are discussed
below. 400
A. CONTEXTUAL SPEECH-PROTECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF
TRADEMARK LAW
It is appropriate for courts to construe trademark law's internal safe-
guards to accommodate First Amendment concerns. 40' Courts should
396. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 672 (5th Cir. 2001).
397. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 569, 572-73 (1974) (void for vagueness doc-
trine); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (overbreadth doctrine); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, at 942-47. The Court has said overbreadth analysis does
not normally apply to commercial speech regulations. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989).
398. See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978).
399. See generally McGeveran, supra note 11; McGeveran, supra note 25.
400. If legislatures and courts protect free expression in trademark law using one or
more of these methods, it is possible other countries will argue that the United States is not
meeting its international obligations to protect trademark rights under intellectual prop-
erty treaties and international trade agreements covering trademarks. This topic is beyond
the scope of this Article.
401. Cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 156, 221 n.24 (2003).
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generally avoid constitutional analysis of trademark law if the dispute can
be resolved on doctrinal grounds. 40 2 If "an otherwise acceptable con-
struction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems," the
canon of constitutional avoidance dictates that courts should "construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress. '40 3 Courts must first attempt to re-
solve any conflict between trademark law and the First Amendment by
interpreting trademark claims narrowly and trademark defenses broadly
in ways that protect expression. 40 4
This is the current approach by most courts sympathetic to free speech
interests in trademark cases. For example, courts protect the free flow of
commercial information when they determine that a certain term is de-
scriptive without secondary meaning and, thus, is not a protectable
mark. 405 Courts guard First Amendment values when they conclude that
an effective parody (such as "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys) is not likely to
cause confusion or dilution in this particular case 406 or hold that a certain
use of the mark qualifies for the descriptive or nominative fair use de-
fense.407 Courts protect noncommercial expression when they find there
is no infringement after applying the Rogers balancing test in cases in-
volving the use of trademarks in artistic or literary expression.408 First
Amendment speech is protected in these cases.
402. Leval, supra note 25, at 210. Courts will often decline to analyze a First Amend-
ment defense if they can find for the defendant on other grounds. E.g., Davis v. Walt
Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's finding of no
likelihood of confusion where the founder of an environmental organization sued the pro-
ducer and broadcaster of a television movie that used "Earth Protector" as the name for a
fictional organization in the film).
403. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-72 (1947)(explaining why courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication); Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
404. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[W]here the unauthorized use of a trademark is part of an expressive
work, such as a parody, the Lanham Act must be construed narrowly."); cf Cliffs Notes,
Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989) (As the
likelihood of confusion test "is at best awkward in the context of parody, which must evoke
the original and constitutes artistic expression," courts should apply the factors "with
proper weight given to First Amendment considerations."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. 1 (1995) ("The expression of an idea by means of the use
of another's trademark as a parody, for example, will often lie within the substantial consti-
tutional protection accorded noncommercial speech and may thus be the subject of liability
only in the most narrow circumstances.") (quoted in Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,
164 F.3d 806, 813 n.14 (2d Cir. 1999)).
405. E.g., Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am., Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 873-75 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Japan Telecom"); In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("The Best Beer in America").
406. E.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th
Cir. 2007); Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 & n.3; World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big
Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 430-43 (W.D. Penn. 2003); Tommy Hilfiger Li-
censing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
407. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
2002); Zatarian's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
408. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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Moreover, there are advantages to using a contextual speech-protective
interpretation of trademark law. This method of protecting expression is
usually more fair and just for the individual parties in most trademark
cases. Case-by-case analysis provides the fact-finder with more flexibility
to consider the unique circumstances of a particular trademark dispute.
The judge can balance the benefits of trademark protection in this case
for this mark against the free speech interests, and other interests, of the
defendant, competitors, and the rest of the public in allowing the defen-
dant's trademark use to continue. Contextual analysis also allows courts
to avoid constitutional analysis and the complicated First Amendment
doctrines that come with it.
Yet there are serious disadvantages to solely using a contextual ap-
proach in trademark law to protect expression. Unless a previous case
has very similar facts, it will be difficult for new trademark litigants to
predict the outcome of the court's application of the various multi-factor,
fact-specific tests. Moreover, the judge may be reluctant to rule on a mo-
tion to dismiss. For example, one court refused to grant a motion to dis-
miss trademark claims based on alleged rights in the phrase "The Crime
Channel" for television programming because, among other things, the
generic nature of the mark and whether the term had acquired secondary
meaning were questions of fact.409 Individuals and small firms who can-
not predict a successful outcome with certainty and/or who are unable to
afford the cost of litigation will likely settle and agree to stop using the
trademarked words.
Another problem with a contextual speech-protective approach to
trademark disputes is that some fact-finders may discount the value of the
defendant's speech in certain cases and refuse to interpret trademark law
through a "First Amendment lens." If the plaintiff's mark is a well-
known brand and the defendant is sleazy or the message incorporating
the mark is distasteful, the judge or jury may rule for the plaintiff despite
its speech-harmful trademark claims. For example, courts punished and
enjoined further use of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader's trademarked
outfits in a pornographic film and use of the Coca-Cola marks and logos
in a poster with the phrase "Enjoy Cocaine. '410 A fact-finder may deem
a certain trademark distinctive or a certain use of a trademark confusing,
diluting, or commercial because he or she dislikes the defendant or its
expression.
Finally, if a court believes it is interpreting trademark claims narrowly
and trademark defenses broadly in ways that protect expression, but it
still rules for the plaintiff, it is not clear how the court knows its statutory
construction is truly and sufficiently speech-protective without engaging
in some sort of constitutional analysis. If the defendant raises a First
409. Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prod., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074-75 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
410. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court's current First Amendment
jurisprudence requires the judge to engage in constitutional analysis of
this speech restriction and explain in the opinion why this law does not
violate the First Amendment if the judge rules for the plaintiff.
If the court believes the defendant should prevail as a matter of law
under the trademark statute, it can avoid constitutional analysis by ruling
on other grounds. Yet when courts dispose of a case on purely doctrinal
grounds, such as where the plaintiff's mark is clearly generic or the defen-
dant's use of the mark plainly qualifies for the fair use defense, courts are
just interpreting the statute. The built-in First Amendment safeguards of
the statute already protect expression, and thus a speech-protective inter-
pretation of the statute is not necessary.
That means a speech-protective statutory interpretation (and the canon
of constitutional avoidance) only matters in close cases when it is not
entirely clear who should prevail under the trademark statute. For exam-
ple, the court may find it difficult to decide whether this descriptive term
has acquired distinctiveness, this parody is likely to cause confusion or
dilution of the mark, or this use of a mark qualifies for the fair use or
nominative use defense. It may be unclear whether the infringement stat-
ute requires a commercial or trademark use of a mark. If the trademark
use is noncommercial speech or nonmisleading commercial speech, this
application of trademark law could raise serious First Amendment con-
cerns. In such circumstances, how will the court know it needs to inter-
pret the law in a speech-protective manner, rather than just rely on the
burden of proof to decide the case, without evaluating the constitutional-
ity of that law? Do judges apply intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis in
their chambers and then use a speech-protective interpretation of the
statute in the opinion? Do they consult law review articles written by
scholars on the topic? Do judges rely on intuition? In such cases, the
parties and public will likely benefit if the court's constitutional analysis is
transparently set forth in the opinion.
When courts apply multi-factor balancing tests to the unique factual
circumstances in each case, they can protect speech in individual trade-
mark disputes and still further the goals of trademark law. Yet this ap-
proach may generally suppress and chill protected speech more than
necessary when many small firms and individuals cannot afford to litigate
and courts refuse to dismiss speech-harmful claims before discovery.
Moreover, sometimes a trademark statute does not permit a construction
by courts that is sufficiently speech-protective. In such cases, courts
should apply First Amendment scrutiny to that trademark law.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Courts can also protect expression in trademark disputes by consider-
ing whether trademark laws or injunctions satisfy First Amendment scru-
tiny. As discussed in Part II, trademark laws should be subject to
intermediate constitutional analysis under Central Hudson when they
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regulate nonmisleading commercial speech and strict scrutiny analysis
when they regulate noncommercial speech unless the Court determines
that lesser constitutional scrutiny is required.
Like contextual analysis in trademark law, constitutional analysis al-
lows courts to consider the unique circumstances of a particular trade-
mark case. It can be more fair and just than a rigid trademark rule. Yet
constitutional analysis is usually more speech protective than contextual
analysis in difficult cases where the goals of trademark law and free ex-
pression significantly conflict but the plaintiff should clearly prevail under
the trademark doctrine. First Amendment scrutiny requires courts to
identify the government interest behind this particular speech restriction
and determine whether that goal is substantial or compelling. Some of
the alleged goals of trademark law will not withstand such scrutiny, such
as protection of the goodwill invested in a descriptive mark from misap-
propriation.4 1' The court must also determine whether this law is suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored and, under strict scrutiny analysis, whether the
law is the least restrictive means of furthering this goal. Except for the
Rogers balancing test (which only applies in limited circumstances), no
other trademark doctrine requires the court to explicitly balance the
goals of trademark law against the interest in free expression.
If courts engage in constitutional analysis, it will be more difficult for
them to allow speech-harmful trademark claims to proceed without suffi-
cient justification. Because the judge sets forth the First Amendment
analysis in the opinion, the evaluation of the constitutionality of that
trademark law is explicit and transparent. More importantly, constitu-
tional analysis may be the only means for courts to truly prevent certain
trademark laws from suppressing and chilling protected expression. If a
court believes (as I do) that it is unconstitutional to protect trademark
rights in descriptive terms, it has several options. It can hold that a de-
scriptive term in a particular case has not acquired distinctiveness or that
the defendant has not committed a trademark violation. This contextual
speech-protective interpretation of the law will avoid constitutional anal-
ysis and protect this individual defendant's right of commercial expres-
sion. Yet it will not protect future defendants who want to use different
descriptive terms claimed by others as trademarks, but whose speech is
chilled by current descriptive trademark laws. Speech will be better pro-
tected in trademark law generally if the court applies constitutional scru-
tiny and holds that this federal or state trademark statute is
unconstitutional when applied to descriptive terms.412 This court's consti-
tutional analysis could then be cited by trademark defendants and the
recipients of cease and desist letters in support of the argument that
trademark laws are unconstitutional when applied to descriptive terms.
411. Ramsey, supra note 7, at 1152-56.
412. It is clear from the provisions of the Lanham Act that Congress intends to protect
descriptive terms used as marks if they acquire distinctivensss, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) & (f)
(2000), so courts cannot simply hold the Lanham Act does not apply to descriptive terms.
Constitutional analysis is required.
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Increasing First Amendment scrutiny of trademark law will not stop all
frivolous allegations, but it should discourage at least some unfounded,
speech-harmful trademark claims.
Although constitutional analysis can protect speech in trademark cases,
there are various disadvantages to explicitly considering First Amend-
ment interests in trademark disputes. First, unnecessary constitutional
adjudication will consume valuable resources. If the case can be resolved
in favor of the defendant on other grounds, it may be more costly and
time consuming if the parties and judge also consider a First Amendment
challenge in the trademark dispute. Such concerns are valid, but these
burdens on the judicial system must be balanced against the benefits of
the free flow of information and ideas, as well as increased competition
when firms can use the full range of language to sell their wares. In-
creased First Amendment scrutiny of trademark law in judicial opinions
may create incentives for legislatures to draft leaner and more effective
laws that further the goals of trademark law while still protecting expres-
sion from unnecessary restriction. Once a court has engaged in a com-
plete constitutional analysis of a particular trademark law, future courts
may be able to cite this opinion to support their conclusion that a law is
constitutional or unconstitutional. (Although a constitutional law may be
unconstitutional as applied to particular circumstances). Over time, not
only may trademark statutes become more constitutional as legislatures
pay closer attention to First Amendment concerns, but parties and courts
may consume less resources on First Amendment analysis in trademark
disputes because they can free ride on the constitutional arguments and
analysis made in past trademark cases.
Another significant problem with constitutional analysis in trademark
cases is that "[c]onstitutional rulings have far-reaching implications and
are not easily undone. '' 413 As noted by Judge Leval, "[a] gradual incre-
mental process of adjudication enables courts to understand legal doc-
trine better and better. Postponing constitutional adjudication until it is
unavoidable guards against making constitutional rules before the subject
is well understood. '414 Furthermore, he explains
[t]he relationship between legislature and courts ... involves a dia-
logue in which the legislature retains the ultimate power to override
statutory interpretations that it does not favor, but, as soon as the
court rules that the reach of a statute violates the Constitution, a
large portion of the legislature's role in the dialogue is precluded. 415
These are all good reasons for judges to primarily rely on "the free
speech-protecting policies of the trademark law" rather than constitu-
tional adjudication when they can rule for the defendant on other
grounds.416 Yet courts should not hesitate to find certain trademark laws






unconstitutional if they significantly suppress or chill protected speech.
In addition, if the plaintiff markholder is the one that will prevail upon
application of the trademark statute, a First Amendment challenge must
be addressed, even if only briefly, if it is pled and raised by the defendant.
Another disadvantage with constitutional scrutiny of trademark law is
that such an analysis violates the principle of evaluative neutrality that is
central to the concept of freedom of expression.417 Scholars have criti-
cized the "ad hoc balancing" that occurs with much constitutional analy-
sis.418 The court must decide whether the goals of trademark law are
substantial or compelling-a point on which reasonable persons may dis-
agree-and apply the multi-factor Central Hudson test or strict scrutiny
analysis to this speech restriction. When the court balances the goals of
trademark law and free expression, there is no clear method for assigning
value to each of these interests or deciding which should prevail. The
court may ultimately hold the speech regulation is constitutional (or un-
constitutional) due to its dislike (or support) of the particular expression
incorporating the trademark. As discussed in the next section, adopting
speech-protective trademark rules is one way to partially address this
problem because it reduces the fact-finder's analysis to a decision about
whether a particular rule applies.
One final problem with constitutional balancing in trademark cases is
that First Amendment analysis may not actually be fully speech-protec-
tive in the real world. The defendant must spend money and time on the
trademark litigation to achieve a favorable result. If the court refuses to
evaluate a First Amendment challenge on a motion to dismiss, the defen-
dant will have to proceed through discovery to summary judgment or
trial, which will be even more costly and time consuming. Due to the
expense of litigation, the defendant may settle rather than litigate for the
right to use the trademarked language. Constitutional analysis of trade-
mark law is not speech protective if courts never get a chance to consider
the constitutionality of the law due to settlement of the litigation.
First Amendment analysis is definitely not perfect, but it can protect
speech interests in individual trademark cases. Moreover, it may actually
be used by courts behind the scenes when they "avoid" constitutional
analysis and construe the trademark statutes in speech-protective ways.
Either approach is better than ignoring free speech interests when trade-
mark claims conflict with the First Amendment. The next section dis-
cusses a third approach to this conflict that may do a better job protecting
speech globally in trademark law.
417. ALEXANDER, supra note 160, at 11, 66, 176-81.
418. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First




C. SPEECH-PROTECTIVE TRADEMARK RULES
A third way to address the potential conflict between trademark law
and the First Amendment is for legislatures and courts to craft more
speech-protective rules for trademark law. Such trademark rules are also
called "categorical safe harbors" or "carve outs from liability. '419 The
noncommercial use exemption in the federal trademark dilution statute is
an example of a statutory trademark rule.420 So is the exemption in the
dilution statute for "news reporting and news commentary" 421 and for
certain nontrademark fair uses of a mark, such as "advertising or promo-
tion that permits consumers to compare goods or services" and "identify-
ing and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark
owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner. '422 Courts
also craft speech-protective trademark rules when they hold that applica-
tion of a trademark provision to a certain type of speech "offends the
Constitution," such as invoking Maine's "anti-dilution statute as a basis
for enjoining the noncommercial use of a trademark by a defendant en-
gaged in a protected form of expression. '423
Courts and legislatures often explicitly or implicitly use "definitional
balancing" rather than ad hoc constitutional balancing when they create a
speech-protective categorical rule.424 In the trademark context, they bal-
ance the relevant goals of trademark law against the value of free speech
generally, not just in this specific case.425 They decide that this particular
trademark restriction harms protected speech-using constitutional anal-
ysis, or some other method-and exempt all speech within the defined
category from liability, or subject restrictions of this speech to different
rules. Thereafter, courts determine whether the defendant's expression
falls within the rule. If it does, the rule applies. The Court used this
approach for defamation law in New York Times v. Sullivan and later
defamation cases. 426
It would be best if legislatures enacted more speech-protective trade-
mark rules. If they do not, courts should implement them in the common
law. This may force the legislature to enact a statute that clarifies the
419. McGeveran, supra note 25, at 1225-26.
420. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006).
421. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B) (2006).
422. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006).
423. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1987).
424. See Nimmer, supra note 418, at 935 (discussing the benefits of definitional balanc-
ing compared to ad hoc balancing); cf. Volokh, supra note 374, at 2418 (arguing that the
Court should "shift away from means-ends scrutiny, and toward an approach that operates
through categorical rules").
425. Cf Nimmer, supra note 418, at 935.
426. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ('The constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech
and press] require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."); see Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967) (adopting a similar rule for public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974) (applying different rules for defamation of private figures).
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doctrine, such as whether trademark use is an element for a prima facie
trademark claim. 427 Legislatures have allowed, if not encouraged, courts
to develop the common law of trademarks. They have also acknowl-
edged that trademark laws can raise legitimate First Amendment con-
cerns. For this reason, lawmakers may not object if courts create
trademark rules that make trademark statutes more speech-protective. If
the legislature does not like a new trademark rule crafted by the court, it
can enact a statute eliminating that rule. If that statute is clearly uncon-
stitutional, then the court should no longer avoid constitutional analysis;
it should apply intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis and find the law
unconstitutional.
Examples of potential trademark rules include a ban on trademark
protection for descriptive terms,428 and blanket exemptions from trade-
mark infringement liability for news reporting and news commentary,
among other proposals.429 Some scholars argue that "trademark use" of
the plaintiff's mark currently is, or should be, a requirement for a prima
facie trademark claim.430 Such a rule was embraced by the Second Cir-
cuit.431 This rule would exempt from trademark liability all non-
trademark uses of another's mark, including use of a mark to trigger
keyword advertising, use of marks in artistic or literary works, and other
uses of a mark that do not identify the source of the product or service. 432
Critics argue such a broad rule could result in less transparent decision-
making and elevate formalism over contextual analysis in trademark
rulemaking.433 Moreover, some scholars note that trademark use may
not serve a true gatekeeper function on motions to dismiss if courts need
to consider consumer perceptions when deciding whether this use of the
mark actually designates a product source.434 A nontrademark use ex-
emption could offer significant free speech benefits in many trademark
disputes, however, if legislatures or courts deemed certain uses of a mark
427. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenUcom, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, 456 F.Supp.2d 393 (N.D.N.Y 2006) (noting courts disagree on
"whether the purchase or sale of a trademark as a keyword that triggers the appearance of
an advertisement is a trademark infringement").
428. See Ramsey, supra note 7, for an explanation of why descriptive trademark laws
are unconstitutional.
429. McGeveran, supra note 25, at 1225-26; McGeveran, supra note 11, at 77-84.
430. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 255, at 378-79; Barrett, supra note 22, at 979-87; Mark
A. Lemley & Stacey L. Dogan, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1694-98 (2007); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of
Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (2004).
431. See 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d 400.
432. This rule would make the fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000), nomina-
tive fair use defense, New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308(9th Cir. 2002), and exemptions from dilution liability "for fair use, including a nominative
or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use," 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006),
superfluous. See Ramsey, supra note 11, at 155 n.66 (making this point with regard to the
fair use defense).
433. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextual-
ism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.
Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007).
434. See McKenna, supra note 230.
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to be a nontrademark use. This would add more predictability and clarity
to the law.
Rather than adopt a broad trademark use requirement, legislatures or
courts could also create and use a more narrow trademark rule. For ex-
ample, categorical safe harbors could be designed to protect particular
trademark defendants, such as Internet service providers, or specific ac-
tivities from regulation, such as keyword advertising. 435 The government
could also craft a categorical exemption from trademark liability for any
nontrademark use of a mark in commentary, parody or satire, regardless
of whether the mark is used in commercial or noncommercial speech.
436
The First Amendment rights of third parties and the public would benefit
if the government adopted some sort of trademark use requirement in
trademark law, whether broad or narrow in scope.
Clear and fixed rules have some advantages. 437 They allow courts to
avoid the interpretive fray of multi-factor balancing tests and constitu-
tional analysis. Trademark rules make it easier for defendants to predict
in advance whether a trademark holder is likely to prevail in a trademark
lawsuit. Defendants may be more successful in recovering Rule 11 sanc-
tions for frivolous claims that ignore a trademark rule.438 Categorical
safe harbors give courts the tools to dispose of speech-harmful trademark
claims early on a motion to dismiss. This will safeguard the right of ex-
pression of individuals and small companies who cannot afford to litigate
through discovery to summary judgment or trial or pay for an expensive
trademark survey. Because rules provide more guidance to decision-
makers, they may also be more speech-protective in cases involving unsa-
vory defendants or unwholesome speech where the judge or jury may be
tempted to rule against the person or speech they dislike.
435. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 433, at 1664-66; see also Eric
Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, eds., 2008).
436. Such a rule would not apply in cases where the defendant used the parodic or
satirical term as a mark, such as the defendant's use of the term "Chewy Vuiton" for dog
toys. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266-67 (4th
Cir. 2007).
437. See Bollinger, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 185, at 16-18; see
also Louis Kaplow, Rules Verses Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Volokh, supra note 374, at 2418.
438. See Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. D.C. Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337-41 & 341 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions). In California, the
court may also be willing to dismiss the trademark claims under California's Anti-Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 425.16(b)(1) (stating a defendant may move to strike a claim arising from any "act in
furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or Cali-
fornia Constitution in connection with a public issue"). In Bosley, the district court
granted the defendant's Anti-SLAPP motion to strike Bosley's state law trademark claims,
but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings on these claims. Bos-
ley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 682 (2005) (stating "[an infringement lawsuit
by a trademark owner over a defendant's unauthorized use of the mark as his domain
name does not necessarily impair the defendant's free speech rights").
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Yet speech-protective trademark rules also have their disadvantages. 439
They are not flexible in individual trademark cases. They may be unfair
to trademark holders and allow some socially harmful trademark uses to
continue if courts permit some uses of a mark that would otherwise be
restricted under a multi-factor trademark test or constitutional scrutiny.
Free speech may suffer if courts enforce speech-harmful trademark laws
or injunctions just because they fit outside a particular rule. Adopting
trademark rules also does not completely eliminate subjectivity and the
possible risk of bias in trademark cases, as the judge must still determine
whether a particular use of a trademark fits within a rule.440
Another problem is determining the appropriate level of specificity or
generality for the trademark rule. Specific rules, such as an exemption
for use of a mark within news reporting or news commentary, are only
useful in limited circumstances. Protected expression not covered by a
specific statutory trademark rule could be suppressed by courts that as-
sume the legislature only seeks to exempt the expression specifically
listed. On the other hand, general rules may not properly balance the
rights of markholders and those who use their marks, and may apply to
new circumstances in unanticipated and undesirable ways. It may be dif-
ficult to draft narrowly-tailored trademark rules that further the goals of
trademark law and protect the right of freedom of expression.
Trademark law should retain some flexible trademark doctrines, such
as the likelihood of confusion analysis, because they give judges the dis-
cretion to achieve justice in each individual case based on its unique facts.
Yet in particularly troublesome areas of the law where protected speech
is more likely to be suppressed or chilled, courts should adopt speech-
protective trademark rules. They may be effective in deterring some un-
founded trademark claims, increasing predictability in trademark cases,
and enabling judges to quickly and easily dispose of trademark disputes
that threaten to harm free speech. The next time it has the chance, the
Supreme Court should say what specific trademark laws are constitu-
tional and unconstitutional under the First Amendment and craft speech-
protective trademark rules if legislatures refuse to adequately protect ex-
pression in trademark statutes.
CONCLUSION
Trademark laws restrict and punish the use of language. For this rea-
son, some trademark laws conflict with the First Amendment right of free
expression. Increasing First Amendment scrutiny of trademark law will
be complicated and will consume some scarce judicial resources. Yet ro-
bust examination of the potential conflict between free speech and trade-
mark law will benefit society if it encourages Congress, state legislatures,
and courts to craft leaner, more effective trademark laws that do not stifle
439. Cf Schauer, supra note 203, at 288-99.
440. Cf id. at 299; McGowan, supra note 310, at 294-95.
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the free flow of information and ideas. Application of the First Amend-
ment in trademark cases today can discourage frivolous, speech-harmful
trademark claims in the future.
44 1
441. See generally Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/
trademark.
[Vol. 61
